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CLASS  ACTION  SQUARED:  MULTISTATE  ACTIONS
AND  AGENCY DILEMMAS
Elysa M. Dishman*
As the Supreme Court continues to restrict the reach of private class actions, numerous
commentators have championed public enforcement actions by state attorneys general (AGs) as a
superior alternative to hold corporations accountable for misconduct.  While AG actions fill some
of the void left by the forced retreat of the private class action, few scholars have seriously consid-
ered whether the agency problems that exist in private class actions also occur in AG actions.
And, until now, no scholar has recognized the unique agency problems that arise when AGs act
together in multistate actions.
Multistate actions are made up of two discrete layers of “class action.”  On the first level,
AGs frequently aggregate the claims of state residents to bring actions on their behalf, with AGs
acting like lead counsel and state residents resembling class members.  On the second layer, when
multiple AGs bring action together, another “class action” of a sort emerges, with a few AGs
leading a “class” of states and their combined state residents.  In other words, multistate action is
class action squared.
Agency problems are not simply doubled in multistate actions by virtue of being class action
squared.  Rather, an entirely new host of agency dilemmas arise when the two layers of “class
action” interact with each other.  Put more simply, “class action squared” problems create tempta-
tions for AGs to “borrow” and “steal” in multistate actions in ways they could not if they pursued
actions independently.  These problems raise the question of whether multistate action is really a
viable substitute for the private class action and challenge the notion that multistate action is
always better than states going it alone.
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INTRODUCTION
Military generals understand the value of a good alliance.  So do state
attorneys general (AGs) who increasingly band together to pursue multistate
actions.1  AG alliances shift in multistate actions, often depending on their
target.  Highly partisan AG alliances have dominated recent multistate
actions against the federal government, while broader bipartisan coalitions of
AGs have formed in multistate actions against large corporations.2  AGs face
both opportunities and dilemmas in deciding whether to participate in multi-
state actions against large corporations.  On the one hand, by aggregating
claims in a multistate action, AGs can leverage their combined resources to
mount high-stakes litigation, reaping large settlements for their states and
residents.  These multistate settlements can serve to deter future corporate
fraud and compensate victims.  But on the other hand, participating in multi-
1 See PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL
POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 21–22 (2015); Ann O’M. Bowman, Horizontal Fed-
eralism: Exploring Interstate Interactions, 14 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 535, 541 (2004)
(“This form of interstate cooperation appears to have become more popular over time,
with the number of multistate lawsuits increasing during the decade.”); Colin Provost, The
Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State Attorney General Participation in Multi-State Law-
suits, 59 POL. RSCH. Q. 609, 610–12 (2006) (explaining that the overall number of lawsuits
as well as the number of states participating in multistate actions has increased over time).
2 See Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of
Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 85–95 (2018); Paul Nolette & Colin Provost, Change and
Continuity in the Role of State Attorneys General in the Obama and Trump Administrations, 48
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 469, 488–89 (2018).
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state actions, ironically, can also undermine those same deterrence and com-
pensation goals.
Class action lawsuits face a similar problem.  Class actions aggregate
numerous claims into a single lawsuit that would otherwise be too costly to
bring individually.3  They allow plaintiffs to receive compensation that they
might otherwise forgo, and deter corporations from committing fraud that
creates widespread harm but relatively small-scale individual damages.4  But
agency costs creep into class actions that undermine their ability to ade-
quately compensate plaintiffs and properly deter corporate misconduct.5
Agency costs occur when class counsel enters into “sweetheart settlements”
that result in handsome fees for counsel while class members are left holding
the bag—full of nearly worthless coupons.6
Recognizing this problem, the Supreme Court and policymakers have
steadily restricted private class actions.7  As they recede under judicial and
regulatory pressure, a form of public aggregate litigation, parens patriae
3 See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1383 (2000).
4 See Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae
Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919, 1926–27 (2000); Brian Wolfman & Alan B.
Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 439, 441 (1996) (arguing class actions are “important and useful, both to deter wrong-
ful conduct and to provide compensation for injured plaintiffs”).
5 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 536 (1991) (“Class actions thus are characterized by
high agency costs: that is, a significant possibility that litigation decisions will be made in
accordance with the lawyer’s economic interests rather than those of the class.”); John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the
Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 882–83 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee,
Entrepreneurial Litigation]; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–8, 19–27 (1991).
6 See John C. Coffee Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND.
L.J. 625, 633 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action] (“At its simplest, the
classic form of opportunism in class actions is the ‘sweetheart’ settlement, namely one in
which the plaintiff’s attorney trades a high fee award for a low recovery.”); Susan P. Koniak,
Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1045, 1151–52 (1995); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82
VA. L. REV. 1051, 1053–54 (1996).
7 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852 & n.30 (1999); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 370, 436–39 (2000) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Action Accountability];
Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobil-
ity v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 626–27 (2012) [hereinafter Gilles & Friedman,
After Class] (“Merited or not, the agency cost critique has certainly ushered in a backlash,
spurring—among other things—significant restrictions in the rules governing the certifica-
tion of both damages and injunctive classes, as well as the creation of new limitations upon
standing, particularly in consumer class actions.”); see also Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332) (expanding fed-
eral jurisdiction in class actions).
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actions, have flourished.8  AGs have authority to bring parens patriae actions
on behalf of their states and state residents.9  These actions closely resemble
private class actions because claims of state residents are aggregated into a
single lawsuit led by a “lead counsel,” in the form of an AG.10  However,
parens patriae actions lack the procedural and legal requirements of class
actions.11  Recognizing the power of parens patriae actions to accomplish the
goals of class actions without the same procedural hurdles, some scholars
have called for the expansion of parens patriae actions as a means to fill the
void left by the forced retreat of the class action.12  Others have urged cau-
tion in embracing parens patriae actions because agency costs also arise in
8 See Brunet, supra note 4, at 1921–22 (“Because of the perceived successful settle-
ment of the state parens patriae tobacco cases, states have brought parens patriae suits against
entire industries, including guns, lead paint, and more recently, health maintenance orga-
nizations. . . .  [T]here now exists a blueprint for states to consider filing class-like lawsuits
for injuries to their citizens’ health and overall economic well-being.”).
9 Actions by AGs seeking restitution and redress for state residents are often lumped
into the term parens patriae.  In this Article, I use the term parens patriae generally to
refer to cases in which the AG brings action on behalf of state citizens for monetary relief,
recognizing that parens patriae powers come from both common-law and statutory
sources. See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 492 (2012) [hereinafter Lemos, Aggregate Litiga-
tion] (using the term “parens patriae” similarly).
10 See Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 45 (2014) (stat-
ing that parens patriae actions are “particularly likely to present many of the same
problems as private class action enforcement”); Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the
Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys
General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 362 (1999); Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at
499–500; William H. Pryor Jr., A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and Mul-
tigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1885, 1899 (2000); Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State
Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RES. & ENV’T L. 273, 300 (2007); Ann
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 512 (1995) (“The
parens patriae label . . . often merely dresses up actions that private parties could easily
bring.”).
11 See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 16869 (2014)
(holding that parens patriae action brought by AG was not subject to the removal provi-
sions of the Class Action Fairness Act); Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 7, at
660–61 (“Parens patriae suits are not subject to Rule 23 or contractual waiver provisions,
and so avoid the majority of impediments to contemporary class actions.”); Deborah R.
Hensler, Goldilocks and the Class Action, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 56–57 (2012).
12 See Brunet, supra note 4, at 1919 (arguing that parens patriae suits “should cause
efficiency gains . . . that could help the now tarnished reputation of the class action”);
Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 47, 47 (1975) (“Because of the burdens imposed on the federal court system
by class actions and because of their limitations, interest has been growing in the possibility
of creating alternative procedures, such as parens patriae actions.”); Farmer, supra note 10,
at 362 (describing parens patriae actions as “an efficient alternative to consumer class
actions”); Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 7, at 660 (“In our view, state attorneys
general—alone among public enforcers—have the ability to fill the void left by class
actions, primarily through expanded use of the parens patriae powers that are currently on
the books in most states.”).
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parens patriae actions like they do in class actions.13  This observation has
sparked a debate in the literature about whether parens patriae actions are in
fact analogous to private class actions and the implications of the analogy on
public enforcement.14
The conversation about class actions and parens patriae actions fails to
consider an important development.  It does not consider that AGs are
increasingly acting together in multistate actions.15  When AGs combine
forces in multistate actions, the analogy to the class action compounds, and a
second “class action” of a sort emerges.  In this second “class action,” AGs
combine the aggregated claims of their states and states’ residents.  A few
AGs lead this second “class” that resembles in a way how class counsel repre-
sents class members.  This Article is the first to recognize that multistate
actions are made up of two discrete layers where each layer can be analogized
to a private class action, or what I dub “class action squared.”
To date, the literature has not focused on multistate actions as being
distinct from individual AG actions.  As a result, multistate actions are under-
studied as a phenomenon and undertheorized in the literature.16  This Arti-
cle begins to fill the gap by theorizing about how agency problems arise in
multistate actions and argues that unique agency costs arise in multistate
actions by virtue of being “class action squared.”
Agency problems in multistate actions are not simply doubled by virtue
of being class action squared.  Rather, new agency costs arise when two layers
of “class action” interact in multistate actions.  Put more simply, class action
squared problems create temptations for AGs to “borrow” and “steal” from
one another in multistate actions in ways they could not if they acted alone.
AGs can “borrow” other states’ more expansive enforcement statutes, even if
a particular state legislature has made a policy judgment to the contrary.17
And AGs can “steal” by allocating greater portions of settlements to their own
states, with other AGs either oblivious or indifferent to the theft because of
voter ignorance.  Leading states in multistate settlements are regularly the
states with the highest allocations of settlements, even if other participating
states have larger populations or more affected state residents.18
13 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 511.
14 Cf. id. at 499–500; Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights,
100 MINN. L. REV. 2313, 2352 (2016).
15 See supra note 1.
16 See Colin Provost, An Integrated Model of U.S. State Attorney General Behavior in Multi-
State Litigation, 10 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 1, 2 (2010) (“Multi-state litigation deserves schol-
arly attention because its dynamics are still poorly understood, yet the key players involved
believe that it has had profound effects on regulatory governance.”); Amanda M. Rose,
State Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities
Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1371–75 (2013); Mark Totten, The Enforcers & The Great
Recession, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1664 (2015) (“[T]he role of multistate and mul-
tigovernment actions remains understudied.”).
17 See infra Section III.A.
18 See infra Section III.B.
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Recognizing class action squared agency problems is important because
multistate actions are drastically altering the enforcement landscape.  Some
of the largest and most important settlements in American history are multis-
tate actions, such as the Master Settlement Agreement with tobacco manufac-
turers19 and the National Mortgage Settlement with mortgage servicers.20
Not only can multistate actions yield billion dollar settlements, but they can
also require sweeping corporate reforms that regulate the way entire indus-
tries do business.21  Understanding that agency problems arise in multistate
actions raises the question of whether they are preferable to private class
actions and challenges the notion that multistate action is necessarily better
than states going it alone.
Identifying agency problems raises the question of what can be done to
reduce them.  Agency costs persist when principals lack the ability to effec-
tively monitor agents.22  This Article proposes different avenues to increase
oversight of multistate actions to reduce class action squared problems.  First,
voters could more effectively monitor AGs if there were greater transparency
about settlements.  Second, legislatures could exercise greater oversight over
AGs through their lawmaking and budgeting powers.  Third, judges could
apply greater scrutiny to proposed settlements in multistate actions.  Increas-
ing the ability of voters, the legislature, and the judiciary to monitor AGs’
behavior would reduce unique class action squared problems.
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I sets forth the attributes of
parens patriae actions, multistate actions, and private class actions.  Part II
explores how multistate action is class action squared.  Part III discusses the
unique class action squared agency problems that arise in multistate litiga-
19 The Master Settlement Agreement is the largest civil settlement in American his-
tory.  Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens
Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 968 (2008).  The settlement occurred in
1998 with forty-six states participating for over $200 billion to be paid to the states over
twenty-five years against the four largest U.S. tobacco companies. See Richard P. Ieyoub &
Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of
Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1860 (2000).
20 The National Mortgage Settlement occurred in 2012 and included forty-nine states,
multiple federal agencies and state regulators, and the nation’s five largest mortgage ser-
vicers for over $25 billion. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Federal Government and
State Attorneys General Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers
to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012) [hereinafter
DOJ National Mortgage Settlement Press Release], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fed
eral-government-and-state-attorneys-general-reach-25-billion-agreement-five-largest; see also
Totten, supra note 16, at 1639.
21 See Gifford, supra note 19, at 967–68; Matthew C. Turk, Regulation by Settlement, 66 U.
KAN. L. REV. 259, 260 (2017); Paul Nolette, State Attorneys General Are More and More Power-
ful.  Is That a Problem?, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/05/state-attorneys-general-are-more-and-more-
powerful-is-that-a-problem/ (“AG-led lawsuits have become a crucial part of the American
regulatory landscape, particularly since their resolution often involves millions (even bil-
lions) in fines and new regulatory requirements for the targeted industries.”).
22 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 519.
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tion, and Part IV considers some reforms to increase voter, legislative, and
judicial monitoring to reduce agency problems in multistate actions.
I. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AGGREGATE LITIGATION: PARENS PATRIAE
AND CLASS ACTIONS
AGs are uniquely empowered to bring public aggregate litigation, called
parens patriae actions, to benefit their states and state residents.23  Private
lawyers, also referred to as “private attorneys general,” bring private aggre-
gate litigation, such as class actions.24  Both public and private aggregate liti-
gation seek to compensate injuries and deter corporate misconduct.25
However, public aggregate action has escaped much of the criticism aimed at
class actions for agency cost problems.26  As pressure has mounted on class
actions, public aggregate litigation has thrived in recent years, in part due to
the increased prominence of multistate actions.
A. State Attorneys General Powers and Enforcement Actions
AGs hold a unique state government office.  They have broad authority
to bring parens patriae actions for the benefit of their states and residents.
Parens patriae actions aim to deter misconduct and increasingly seek public
compensation for state residents.  AGs are increasingly pursuing their parens
patriae actions together in multistate actions.
1. Roles and Responsibilities of State Attorneys General
AGs hold a unique position in state government.  In most states, the
office of AG was either created or continued by state constitution.27  Each of
the fifty states and six territories of the United States have an AG’s office or
its functional equivalent.28  The vast majority of AGs are directly elected state-
wide, although some AGs are appointed by other state officials or institu-
tions.29  Most AGs are elected to serve four-year terms.30  The specific duties
23 See NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 38 (shifting from representing only the state to repre-
senting the state and state residents “was significant because by serving as the representa-
tives of individuals and groups allegedly harmed by corporate conduct, AGs essentially
became a form of class action litigator”).
24 This Article focuses primarily on the analogy between AG actions and private dam-
ages class actions and refers to private damages class actions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3) by the shorthand “class actions.”
25 See Cox, supra note 14, at 2350–51; Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 4, at 441.
26 See Alexander, supra note 5, at 536; Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 5, at
882–83; Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 7–8.
27 See NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL POWERS AND RESPONSIBILI-
TIES 7 (Emily Myers ed., 4th ed. 2018).
28 See id. at 12, 107.
29 See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?  Governors, State Attorneys General, and
Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 n.3 (2006).  Forty-three of the
nation’s Attorneys General are elected statewide separately from the Governor or other
state institutions. Id.  State AGs are appointed in the other seven states: Alaska, Hawaii,
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of AGs vary from state to state.  However, the most important duties of the
office include “control of litigation concerning the state; . . . providing for-
mal opinions to clarify the law; . . . criminal law enforcement, primarily on
the appellate level; law reform and legislative advocacy; and investigative
authority.”31
AGs serve multiple constituencies in carrying out their duties.  AGs have
the broad power to “protect the public interest” and the wide discretion to
determine what actions to take in the public’s interest.32  In addition to rep-
resenting the public interest, AGs also represent the state as a political entity
and defend state agencies.33  Because AGs conduct litigation on behalf of the
state, AGs are referred to as the state’s chief legal officer or chief law enforce-
ment officer.34
AGs are considered enforcement generalists, with duties that span myr-
iad issues.35  They have considerable latitude in setting their enforcement
agendas and determining how to deploy the office’s resources in accordance
with their priorities.36  AGs and their staffs are salaried public servants and
are not compensated based on the outcomes of individual cases.37  While AG
offices have become more sophisticated over time, they often operate under
significant budget constraints.38  Their resources are stretched across many
enforcement priorities, and they must carefully utilize their office
resources.39
Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Id.  In Maine, the Attorney
General is selected by the state legislature and, in Tennessee, by the state supreme court.
Id.  In the other five states, Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming, the
Attorney General is appointed by the Governor. Id.
30 See NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., supra note 27, at 18.
31 Id. at 11.
32 See Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 268–69 (5th Cir. 1976)
(“[The AG] typically may exercise all such authority as the public interest requires.  And
the attorney general has wide discretion in making the determination as to the public
interest.”).
33 See About NAAG, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., https://www.naag.org/naag/
about_naag.php (last visited Sept. 19, 2020).
34 See Brandon D. Harper, Comment, The Effectiveness of State-Filed Amicus Briefs at the
United States Supreme Court, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1503, 1510 (2014).
35 See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 717
(2011) [hereinafter Lemos, State Enforcement] (“State enforcement also empowers a differ-
ent set of agents—elected, generalist attorneys general.”); Elysa M. Dishman, Enforcement
Piggybacking and Multistate Actions, 2019 BYU L. REV. 421, 435.
36 See Dishman, supra note 35, at 436.
37 See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 853, 861–62 (2014).  But both federal enforcers and AG offices may benefit from
“revolving funds” that allow these enforcers to keep a portion of enforcement penalties to
fund their offices. Id. at 864.
38 See id. at 859.
39 See Paul Harzen Beach, The Parens Patriae Settlement Auction, 52 GONZ. L. REV. 455,
464 (2017).
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Some have quipped that the acronym “AG” stands for “aspiring gover-
nor.”40  AGs have a reputation for future political ambitions to run for
higher political office such as governor or U.S. senator.41  Empirically, it has
been shown that a majority of AGs run for higher office; however, AGs most
likely to run for future political office are those that lead multistate actions.42
AGs can build a strong policy record based on enforcement actions in order
to propel them to higher office.43  At the same time, as AGs have risen in
prominence to be national enforcers and policymakers, the office of AG has
been recognized as an influential political office in its own right.44
The broad authority to initiate lawsuits on behalf of the state and its
residents is one of the AG’s most important powers.  AGs have recently flexed
this authority to bring parens patriae actions against large corporations as a
means of seeking relief for their states and residents.45  Engaging in this liti-
gation has elevated the prominence of AGs to national policymakers.46
2. Parens Patriae Litigation Authority
AGs have broad discretion and authority to bring parens patriae
actions.47  The authority for parens patriae actions comes from multiple
sources including state and federal statutes and the common law.48  The
most straightforward source of parens patriae authority is state statutes that
allow AGs to seek restitution for state consumers injured by violations of state
consumer protection statutes.49  AGs also derive parens patriae authority to
seek damages for state residents under other state and federal laws.50  Most
40 See Colin Provost, When Is AG Short for Aspiring Governor?  Ambition and Policy Making
Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General, 40 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 597, 597 (2009)
[hereinafter Provost, Aspiring Governor].
41 See id. at 597.
42 See id. at 597, 612.
43 See id. at 599.
44 See NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 20.
45 See Brunet, supra note 4, at 1921–22.
46 See id.; Totten, supra note 16, at 1613; Elysa M. Dishman, Settling Data Protection Law:
Multistate Actions and National Policymaking, 72 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manu-
script at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3577167_code2392605
.pdf?abstractid=3577167&mirid=1.
47 See NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 41.  “Parens patriae literally means ‘parent of the coun-
try’ and refers to the sovereign’s role as guardian of persons under legal disabilities.”  Lou-
ise Harmon, Falling off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE
L.J. 1, 18 (1990) (quoting Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)).
48 See NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., supra note 27, at 106–09; Lemos, Aggregate Litigation,
supra note 9, at 493.
49 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 492.  The line between AG actions
seeking restitution under state consumer protection law and suits under parens patriae is
muddled with restitution actions being referred to as parens patriae actions.  This Article
refers to both as parens patriae actions. See id. at 492–93.
50 See NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 39–40 (listing federal statutes that authorize AG
parens patriae actions); Cox, supra note 14, at 2328.  For a discussion about how states
enforce federal laws, see generally Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 35.
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parens patriae actions are based on express statutory authority,51 even
though parens patriae has “deep roots in the common law.”52
The common-law doctrine of parens patriae allows states to vindicate the
state’s “sovereign” or “quasi-sovereign interests.”53  The leading Supreme
Court case on modern common-law parens patriae is Alfred L. Snapp & Son,
Inc. v. Puerto Rico.54  The Court in Snapp reiterated that the doctrine of
parens patriae allows states to bring action to protect their sovereign or quasi-
sovereign interests.55  A state’s sovereign interests include “the power to cre-
ate and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal.”56  But the term “quasi-
sovereign interests” is ill-defined.57  Generally, quasi-sovereign interests are
“a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace.”58  They
include the state’s “interest in the health and well-being—both physical and
economic—of its residents in general.”59  Importantly, “the State must be
more than a nominal party,”60 meaning both the state and the individuals
must have an interest in the claim.61  That being said, the state’s claim may
be “parasitic” on the claim of the state residents, meaning that the aggre-
gated private interests of state residents may provide the basis of a “quasi-
sovereign state interest.”62
The parens patriae common-law doctrine requires state residents’ claims
to be substantial in number and similar to each other.  The state cannot
bring a parens patriae action on behalf of “particular individuals.”63  Rather,
the state must act on behalf of its “residents in general” that form a “suffi-
51 Cox, supra note 14, at 2328 (“Government enforcers rarely rely on common law
parens doctrine for public compensation.”).  However, courts do not always distinguish
between parens patriae authority based on statute and common law and use the term
“parens patriae” loosely to refer to any state representative litigation. See Lemos, Aggregate
Litigation, supra note 9, at 493.
52 Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 493.  For a history of parens patriae, see
Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195, 201–206
(1978); Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1850–53 (2000).
53 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602, 607
(1982).
54 See id.
55 See id. at 601.
56 Id.
57 Id. (stating the category of “‘quasi-sovereign’ interest . . . is a judicial construct that
does not lend itself to a simple or exact definition”); see also Ratliff, supra note 52, at 1851
(“‘Quasi-sovereign’ is one of those loopy concepts that comes along often enough to
remind us that appellate courts sometimes lose their moorings and drift off into the ether.
It is a meaningless term absolutely bereft of utility.”).
58 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602.
59 Id. at 607.
60 Id.
61 See Ratliff, supra note 52, at 1857–58.
62 Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 494–95 (emphasis in original).
63 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607 n.14; see also Cox, supra note 14, at 2327 (“A key limitation on
a parens action is that the state suit cannot represent solely private interests.”).
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ciently substantial segment of [the state’s] population.”64  The claims of the
state residents are also similar in parens patriae actions.  For example, in
Snapp, the parens patriae action was based on the similar claims of Puerto
Rican residents who were discriminated against in temporary job opportuni-
ties on East Coast farms during a particular harvest season.65  “In other
words, private interests can rise to the level of a quasi-sovereign state interest
when sufficiently aggregated.”66
While state residents’ claims must be sufficiently aggregated, typically
the state residents represented in parens patriae actions are a subset of the
general public.  These parens patriae group members are usually the real
parties of interest in the action.67  Even though they are the real parties of
interest in the action, there are generally few procedural protections in place
for parens patriae group members.68  For example, notice of the action is
generally not provided to parens patriae group members, nor do they have
the opportunity to “opt out” of the action.69
AGs seek a variety of remedies in parens patriae actions including
injunctive relief, civil penalties, and public compensation.70  AGs are increas-
ingly seeking public compensation for the injuries of their state residents.71
For example, the Arizona AG sued and settled with General Motors (GM)
and received compensation for Arizona consumers based on faulty ignition
switches in their vehicles.72  The Washington,73 Illinois,74 and Mississippi
64 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.  However, the “Court has not attempted to draw any defini-
tive limits on the proportion . . . that must be adversely affected.” Id.  In Snapp, the num-
ber of state citizens was relatively few, only impacting 787 temporary jobs for Puerto Ricans
when the population of Puerto Rico was over 3 million. Id. at 599, 609.
65 Id. at 597–98, 609.
66 Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 495.
67 See id. at 495 n.38.
68 See id.  Others have also argued that there is a lack of procedural protections when
federal agencies provide monetary compensation in public enforcement. See Adam S. Zim-
merman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 502–03, 554–55 (2011).
69 See Cox, supra note 14, at 2326, 2330.  However, a notable exception is the antitrust
context, which under federal law and several state statutes requires similar procedures as
private class actions such as notice and the ability to opt out. Id.
70 See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 7, at 661.
71 See Cox, supra note 14, at 2352 (noting the current trend of public compensation
for federal agencies and state AGs); Georgene Vairo, Is the Class Action Really Dead?  Is That
Good or Bad for Class Members?, 64 EMORY L.J. 477, 517, 520 (2014).
72 See Rebecca R. Ruiz, General Motors Is Sued by Arizona for $3 Billion over Recalls, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/business/arizona-sues-gm-
for-3-billion-over-recalls.html.  Interestingly, Arizona began in a multistate action against
GM that was not seeking consumer restitution, but later instead brought its own action
seeking consumer restitution. Id.  Arizona settled with GM for $6.28 million with a mini-
mum of $200 for each impacted consumer. See Press Release, Ariz. Off. of the Att’y Gen.,
AG Brnovich Obtains $6.28 Million for Arizonans Who Purchased Recalled GM Vehicles
(Mar. 7, 2018) [hereinafter Arizona GM Press Release], https://www.azag.gov/press-
release/ag-brnovich-obtains-628-million-arizonans-who-purchased-recalled-gm-vehicles.
73 See Press Release, Wash. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., AGO Recovers $63 Million in
Price-Fixing Scheme Affecting Millions of Washingtonians (May 15, 2015), https://
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AGs75 individually brought action against manufacturers of LCD screens
under their respective antitrust statutes seeking compensation for their state
residents for a price-fixing scheme.  Compensation in parens patriae actions
can be in the form of damages, which is more common in antitrust actions,76
and in the form of restitution, which is more common in consumer protec-
www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ago-recovers-63-million-price-fixing-scheme-affecting-
millions-washingtonians.
74 See Press Release, Ill. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Court Approves Distribution of over
$190 Million to Illinois Consumers in Settlement over Fixed Prices for LCD Screens (Jan.
11, 2018), https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2018_01/20180111.html.
75 In fact, the Supreme Court case, Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., grew
out of such an action brought by the Mississippi AG.  571 U.S. 161, 166 (2014).  An eight-
state multistate action also settled with LCD manufacturers for the same price-fixing
schemes in violation of antitrust laws. See Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen.,
A.G. Schneiderman Announces $571 Million Settlement with LCD Panel Manufacturers in
Price Fixing Case (July 12, 2012), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2012/ag-schneiderman-
announces-571-million-settlement-lcd-panel-manufacturers-price.
76 Damages in parens patriae actions are most common in the antitrust context, but
are also available in other contexts under state statutes. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.577(b)
(2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-212(b) (2020); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16760(a)(1)
(West 2020); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-4-111(1), (2) (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-32(c),
(d) (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2108(b) (2020); FLA. STAT. § 542.22(2) (2019); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 480-14(b) (2019); IDAHO CODE § 48-108(2) (2020); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/
7(2) (2020); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-209(b)(5) (West 2020); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-
212 (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.160(1) (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:4-a(II)
(2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.81(A) (LexisNexis 2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 79,
§ 205(A)(1) (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.775(1)(A) (2019); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-12(a)
(2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-23 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-3106 (LexisNexis
2020); W. VA. CODE § 47-18-17(a) (2020).  Many states also have parens patriae statutes in
nonantitrust contexts. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-129c (2020) (authorizing Connecti-
cut Attorney General to sue as parens patriae on behalf of state residents subjected to
personal income tax by New York City); D.C. CODE § 28-3909(c)(5) (2020) (authorizing
parens patriae suits for restitution and damages on behalf of consumers for violations of
Washington, D.C. consumer protection laws); FLA. STAT. § 626.909(3) (2019) (authorizing
parens patriae actions for damages on behalf of Florida victims of unauthorized insurance
transactions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-21(c) (West 2020) (authorizing parens patriae
actions on behalf of New Jersey victims of bias crimes); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, § 3341
(2019) (authorizing parens patriae actions for damages on behalf of Puerto Rico consum-
ers); 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS §40-8.2-6(a) (2020) (authorizing parens patriae actions for dam-
ages on behalf of Rhode Island victims of medical assistance fraud); WASH. REV. CODE
§19.86.080 (2020) (authorizing parens patriae actions for restitution on behalf of Washing-
ton victims of consumer protection violations).  Some federal statutes also authorize state
AGs to enforce federal law through parens patriae actions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1)
(2018) (authorizing suit for violations of federal antitrust law); id. § 1679h(c)(1) (authoriz-
ing suit for violations of federal law governing credit repair organizations); id. § 1681s(c)
(credit reporting agencies); id. § 5712(a) (pay-per-call services); id. § 6103(a)
(telemarketers); id. § 6309(c) (professional boxing matches); id. § 7804(a)(1) (sports
agents); id. § 6504(a)(1) (children’s online privacy protection); id. § 7706(f)(1) (email
spam).
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tion actions.77  Parens patriae actions are most commonly settled and settle-
ments may include a combination of injunctive relief, civil penalties, and
public compensation.78
While AGs have the authority to bring parens patriae actions alone, they
are increasingly bringing parens patriae actions together to form multistate
actions.79  AGs’ multistate actions have made headlines as they pursued large
corporations and obtained record settlements.  The increasing trend of high-
profile multistate actions has propelled AGs into the spotlight as national
policymakers and enforcers.80
3. Multistate Actions
Multistate actions have been a game changer for AGs seeking to hold
corporations accountable.  By combining forces, AGs have been able to bring
enforcement actions against large industries and obtain record-breaking set-
tlements.  AGs have brought multistate mass products liability lawsuits against
manufacturers of tobacco, lead paint, automobiles, and guns.81  During and
after the financial crisis of 2008, there was a series of multistate actions
against Wall Street banks,82 rating agencies,83 and mortgage servicers.84
77 Restitution is most common in the context of consumer protection parens patriae
actions. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/7 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-69 (West 2020);
see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1521 to 1534 (2020) (allowing AG to seek a court order
to “[r]estore to any person in interest any monies or property” acquired in violation of the
statute and allowing AG to enter into an AOD to provide for “restitution to aggrieved
persons”); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/7 (2020) (noting an AG may seek a court order for
restitution for violation of Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act); IOWA
CODE § 714.16 (2020) (allowing AG to seek a court order for restitution and providing that
“[a] claim for reimbursement may be proved by . . . evidence that would be appropriate in
a class action”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 2019) (AG may seek an order
“directing restitution and damages”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.07 (LexisNexis 2020)
(“On motion of the attorney general . . . the court may make appropriate orders . . . to
reimburse consumers found to have been damaged. . . .”).
78 See Cox, supra note 14, at 2350, 2355; Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at R
527.
79 See Nolette, supra note 21. R
80 See NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 18; Dishman, supra note 46 (manuscript at 8). R
81 See Brunet, supra note 4, at 1921; Gifford, supra note 19, at 914. R
82 See Totten, supra note 16, at 1646–49 (discussing multistate actions during and in
the wake of the Great Recession).
83 See, e.g., Press Release, Cal. Off. of the Att’y Gen., California Attorney General’s
Office Announces $150 Million Settlement with Financial Services Company Moody’s for
Inflating Mortgage-Backed Securities Ratings (Jan. 13, 2017), https://oag.ca.gov/news/
press-releases/california-attorney-generals-office-announces-150-million-settlement-finan-
cial; Press Release, Conn. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Jepsen Leads Multistate
Coalition in $1.375 Billion State-Federal Settlement with Standard & Poor’s (Feb. 3, 2015)
[hereinafter Connecticut S&P Press Release], https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Press-Releases-
Archived/2015-Press-Releases/Attorney-General-Jepsen-Leads-Multistate-Coalition-in-1375-
Billion-StateFederal-Settlement-with-Stan;.
84 Dishman, supra note 35, at 448; see DOJ National Mortgage Settlement Press
Release, supra note 20. R
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High-profile data breaches have also been the subject of multistate actions
and settlements with Equifax,85 Uber,86 Neiman Marcus,87 Nationwide Insur-
ance,88 and Target.89  The opioid epidemic has also sparked a multistate
investigation of the pharmaceutical industry.90
Multistate settlements are some of the largest settlements in American
history.  The Master Settlement Agreement between forty-six states and sev-
eral tobacco companies settled for over $200 billion and was the largest set-
tlement in American history.91  The National Mortgage Settlement, between
forty-nine states and five mortgage servicers, settled for $25 billion.92  Other
multibillion dollar settlements include settlements with Bank of America,
JPMorgan, and others for their role in securitizing Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities (RMBS) as part of a multistate and federal coordinated
85 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Equifax to Pay $575 Million as Part of Settle-
ment with FTC, CFPB, and States Related to 2017 Data Breach (July 22, 2019), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/equifax-pay-575-million-part-settlement-
ftc-cfpb-states-related.
86 See Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Underwood Announces
Record $148 Million Settlement with Uber over 2016 Data Breach (Sept. 26, 2018) [herein-
after New York Uber Press Release], https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2018/ag-underwood-
announces-record-148-million-settlement-uber-over-2016-data-breach.
87 See Press Release, Mass. Off. of the Att’y Gen., AG Healey Joins $1.5 Million Multis-
tate Settlement with Neiman Marcus over 2013 Data Breach (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.
mass.gov/news/ag-healey-joins-15-million-multistate-settlement-with-neiman-marcus-over-
2013-data-breach.
88 See Press Release, N.Y. Off. of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $5.5
Million Multi-State Settlement with Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company over 2012
Data Breach (Aug. 9, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2017/ag-schneiderman-
announces-55-million-multi-state-settlement-nationwide-mutual; Kevin McCoy, Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Agrees to $5.5M Settlement over Data Breach, USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/08/09/nationwide-mutual-insurance-
agrees-5-5-m-settlement-over-data-breach/552687001/.
89 See Press Release, N.Y. Off. of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $18.5
Million Multi-State Settlement with Target Corporation over 2013 Data Breach (May 23,
2017) [hereinafter New York Target Press Release], https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2017/
ag-schneiderman-announces-185-million-multi-state-settlement-target-corporation; Press
Release, Cal. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Becerra: Target Settles Record $18.5
Million Credit Card Data Breach Case (May 23, 2017) [hereinafter California Target Press
Release], https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-target-settles-
record-185-million-credit-card-data; Rachel Abrams, Target to Pay $18.5 Million to 47 States
in Security Breach Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
05/23/business/target-security-breach-settlement.html.
90 See Nadia Kounang, 41 State Attorneys General Subpoena Opioid Manufacturers, CNN
(Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/19/health/state-ag-investigation-opioids-
subpoenas/index.html; see also Nolette & Provost, supra note 2, at 483–88.
91 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
92 See DOJ National Mortgage Settlement Press Release, supra note 20.
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working group,93 and with Standard & Poor’s for its ratings of toxic invest-
ments during the financial crisis.94
Multistate settlements not only command high-dollar settlements, but
also instigate sweeping corporate reforms.  For example, the National Mort-
gage Settlement changed the way mortgages are serviced and foreclosed.95
The Master Settlement Agreement changed how tobacco companies could
advertise.96  Multistate settlements have implemented these reforms, even in
the face of historic opposition to the same type of regulations in state legisla-
tures and Congress.97  This regulatory ability puts tremendous power in the
hands of AGs and has led some scholars to raise concerns about AGs regulat-
ing nationwide through settlements.98
The claims asserted on behalf of state residents in multistate actions are
generally factually similar, arising from the same series of underlying events,
and are asserted against the same defendant or group of defendants.  They
also rely on similar theories, even though they are based on different states’
laws.  For example, the National Mortgage Settlement combined the claims
of state residents based on similar instances of mortgage servicing and fore-
closure abuses leading up to and during the financial crisis.99  Similarly, the
Target multistate settlement included similar claims of consumers whose
credit card information was hacked from Target’s information systems.100
Multistate actions often involve many states, sometimes with almost every
state in the country participating in the action.101  For example, the National
Mortgage Settlement had forty-nine participating states,102 the Target multis-
93 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion in His-
toric Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading up to and During the
Financial Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bank-america-pay-1665-
billion-historic-justice-department-settlement-financial-fraud-leading; Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Just., Justice Department, Federal and State Partners Secure Record $13 Billion
Global Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading Investors About Securities Containing
Toxic Mortgages (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-fed-
eral-and-state-partners-secure-record-13-billion-global-settlement.
94 See Connecticut S&P Press Release, supra note 83.
95 See Consent Judgment at A-1 to A-42, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No.12-cv-
00361 (filed in D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012); DOJ National Mortgage Settlement Press Release,
supra note 20. R
96 See Master Settlement Agreement at 18–28 (Nov. 1998), http://www.naag.org/
assets/redesign/files/msa-tobacco/MSA.pdf; see also Gifford, supra note 19, at 914.
97 See Gifford, supra note 19, at 914.
98 See NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 23; Gifford, supra note 19, at 915 (quoting Robert B. R
Reich, Don’t Democrats Believe in Democracy?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2000), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB947635315729229622); Turk, supra note 21, at 259; Dishman,
supra note 46 (manuscript at 4).
99 See DOJ National Mortgage Settlement Press Release, supra note 20.
100 See sources cited supra note 89.
101 The number of states participating in multistate actions is increasing. See NOLETTE,
supra note 1, at 21–22. R
102 See DOJ National Mortgage Settlement Press Release, supra note 20.  Similar actions
against mortgage servicers had wide participation among the states.  For example, settle-
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tate settlement had forty-seven participating states,103 the Western Union
multistate settlement had fifty participating states,104 and the Master Settle-
ment Agreement had forty-six states.105  Since each AG represents a large
number of state residents, the interests of many states and people are repre-
sented in multistate actions.
While many states may participate in multistate actions, generally only a
few states lead them.106  For example, the Target multistate action was led by
Illinois and Connecticut.107  AGs may also form an executive committee to
lead a multistate action.  For example, the National Mortgage Settlement was
led by an executive committee of AGs.108  The same states tend to take a
leadership role in multistate litigation.109  For example, the New York AG
ments with PHH, SunTrust, HBSC, and Ocwen all had forty-nine states participating in the
settlements. See Press Release, N.Y. Off. of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces
$45 Million Multi-State Settlement with PHH Mortgage Corporation (Jan. 3, 2018), https:/
/ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-45-million-multi-state-settlement-
phh-mortgage-corporation; Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB, State
Authorities Order Ocwen to Provide $2 Billion in Relief to Homeowners for Servicing
Wrongs (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-
state-authorities-order-ocwen-to-provide-2-billion-in-relief-to-homeowners-for-servicing-
wrongs/; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Federal Government and State Attorneys Gen-
eral Reach Nearly $1 Billion Agreement with SunTrust to Address Mortgage Loan Origina-
tion as Well as Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (June 17, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/federal-government-and-state-attorneys-general-reach-nearly-1-billion-agreement-
suntrust; Press Release, Mass. Dep’t of Just., $470 Million State-Federal Settlement Reached
with HSBC over Unlawful Foreclosures, Loan Servicing (Feb. 5, 2016), https://
www.mass.gov/news/470-million-state-federal-settlement-reached-with-hsbc-over-unlawful-
foreclosures-loan.
103 See New York Target Press Release, supra note 89.
104 Press Release, N.Y. Off. of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces Settle-
ment with Western Union to Develop Stronger Anti-Fraud Programs (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-western-union-
develop-stronger-anti-fraud.
105 See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 1859.
106 See NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 26; Bowman, supra note 1, at 540–41 (“A core group of R
eleven states, many of them large states, appears to have played leadership roles, given
their high level of involvement.”); Prentiss Cox, Amy Widman & Mark Totten, Strategies of
Public UDAP Enforcement, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 37, 95–97 (2018) (describing a “[h]eavies”
group of states that lead multistate actions); Dishman, supra note 35, at 451–52; Provost,
supra note 16, at 3.
107 See 2016-2017 CONN. ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 22–23 [hereinafter CONN. ANN. REP.];
Press Release, Ill. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Madigan Announces $18.5 Mil-
lion Settlement with Target over Data Breach (May 23, 2017) [hereinafter Illinois Target
Press Release], http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2017_05/20170523b.
html.
108 For example, the states that served on the National Mortgage Settlement Executive
Committee were Iowa, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illi-
nois, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. See Con-
sent Judgment at B-5, supra note 95.
109 See NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 26–28 (“Many states participate in multistate litigation,
but only a few states typically take a leading role in these efforts.”).
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leads multistate actions more often than any other AG, and nearly twice as
often as the next most active AG in leading multistate actions.110
Multistate actions often begin with one AG or a small group of AGs
doing much of the early investigative work.111  “[T]he states initiating the
action will often propose a multistate working group and offer to chair or co-
chair the group.”112  These leading AGs play an important coordinating role,
performing litigation tasks such as organizing document reviews.113  That
same small group of AGs files the first lawsuits and then negotiates the settle-
ment through executive or negotiating committees.114  “Typically, the
lead[ing AGs] will send out settlement information to the other [AGs]” who
are “not currently part of the [action], to determine [whether they want] to
join a proposed settlement.”115  Leading AGs who negotiate settlements “play
the most important role in bringing a case to its conclusion.”116
While a few AGs consistently lead multistate actions, other AGs who par-
ticipate contribute significantly fewer resources to the action.117  Once a law-
suit is initially filed after investigation, some AGs may “file lawsuits in their
own states” and “help with the remainder of the work to be done.”118  Some
AGs contribute “nothing more than a signature” on the settlement agree-
ment that the leading AGs have already negotiated.119  These AGs essentially
free-ride on the enforcement resources and efforts of leading AGs.120  In
essence, multistate litigation is organized as a pyramid with a few leading AGs
at the top and other AGs making smaller contributions on the lower levels of
the pyramid.
By bringing an action together, states can more efficiently leverage state
enforcement resources.121  Using their combined efforts and resources, AGs
110 See id. at 27.
111 See Provost, supra note 16, at 3.
112 NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 26.  The National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG) facilitates interactions among AGs, and coordinates federal-state working group
and multistate actions, in particular multistate antitrust actions. See What Is the National
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG)?, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., https://www.naag.org/
naag/about_naag/faq/what_is_the_national_association_of_attorneys_general_naag.php
(last visited Sept. 19, 2020).
113 NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 26.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.; see also Cox et al., supra note 106, at 84 (explaining that enforcers who serve on
executive or monitoring committees are “always the leaders who move [the case] forward
and bring it to a close”).
117 See Cox et al., supra note 106, at 84; Dishman, supra note 35, at 42582. R
118 Provost, supra note 16, at 3.
119 Cox et al., supra note 106, at 84 (“Participants may lend nothing more than a signa-
ture to a settlement agreement . . . .”).
120 See Dishman, supra note 35, at 425.
121 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 523 (noting “[a]ttorneys general
have limited budgets and small staffs” but “can achieve some economies of scale by band-
ing together in multistate actions”); Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of
Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 9 (2004) (noting attor-
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may be able to demand greater compensation for their combined state
residents and collectively hold corporations accountable.  The attributes and
goals of AG actions closely resemble class action lawsuits.
B. Private Class Actions
Private class actions allow claims to be aggregated in order to compen-
sate injuries and deter misconduct more efficiently.122  Class actions allow for
economies of scale by combining many small claims into a single action that
would otherwise be too costly to pursue individually.  They provide redress
for situations that incur widespread injuries but generate only small-scale
damages.123  Class actions are privately funded by entrepreneurial attorneys
who self-finance the litigation and are only paid upon achieving a recovery
for the class.124  These private counsel have been referred to as “private
Attorney Generals” because of their role in “vindicat[ing] the public interest”
by bringing class action lawsuits.125  However,  in many instances, the private
attorney general has not lived up to its ideal and has fueled the agency cost
critique of class actions.126
1. Attributes of Class Actions
Class actions are a distinct form of litigation that’s attributes are shaped
by procedural rules, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.127  There
neys general offices are “chronically underfunded”); Totten, supra note 16, at 1664 (noting
absent collaboration, states could not have played a critical role in Great Recession
enforcement).
122 See Brunet, supra note 4, at 1927 (“[T]he class action device provided potential for
an efficient deterrent to wrongdoing.  Corporate wrongdoers would no longer be safe if
they only caused small injuries.”); Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 4, at 441; see also Gilles
& Friedman, After Class, supra note 7, at 626.
123 See Brunet, supra note 4, at 1926 (noting that “[b]y aggregating potential claims that
might not have been economically filed, the class action created the possibility that valid
legal and factual claims could be compensated”); Vairo, supra note 71, at 528.
124 See Brunet, supra note 4, at 1923.  However, states use a public/private funding
hybrid with AGs hiring private counsel to bring actions on behalf of the state based on
contingency fees. See Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515,
533 (2016).
125 John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as
Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 216 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee, Private
Attorney General]; William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why it
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2134 (2004) (quoting Associated Indus. N.Y. v. Ickes, 134
F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943)).
126 See Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note 125, at 215–20.
127 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  In most states, the state procedural rules largely mirror the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kelso L. Anderson, Fifty-State Survey Provides Rudder on
State Class Action Law, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/
publications/litigation-news/book-reviews/fifty-state-survey-provides-rudder-on-state-class-
action-law/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2020) (“Knowledge of key U.S. Supreme Court precedents
that impact state class action law is particularly useful in the 45 states where procedural
laws mirror Rule 23.”).
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are several procedural requirements for a class action to be certified.128
First, class actions are required to have “numerous” class members.129  Sec-
ond, there must be common questions of law or fact among the class.130
Such questions of law or fact must “predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members.”131 “Commonality” has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to require that class members must “have suffered the same
injury,” that “[t]heir claims must depend upon a common contention” that is
“central to the validity of each one of the claims,” and that resolution of the
common contention must resolve a central issue “in one stroke.”132  This
stricter version of the commonality requirement has increased the difficulty
of class certification.133  Third, class actions are required to have a class rep-
resentative.134  A class representative is a plaintiff who must have claims that
are “typical” of the claims of the class.135
Class actions also have notice and opt-out procedures in place to protect
class members.  Class members must be notified of the action and given the
opportunity to opt out.136  Notice must be the “best notice that is practicable
under the circumstances” which is generally individual notice.137  Class mem-
bers may choose to opt out of the class and instead pursue individual action.
However, if class members do not opt out of the class, they will be bound by
the ultimate resolution of the case and precluded from future action.138
Courts are responsible for protecting the class’s interests at important
junctions of the litigation including certification and settlement.  Courts
determine whether a class will be certified based on procedural require-
ments.  As part of certification, the court must find that the class action is
“superior” to other alternatives such as individual lawsuits.139  Class counsel
128 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 502–03.
129 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
130 See FED R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
131 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
132 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–50, 350 n.5 (2011) (quoting Gen.
Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)).
133 See Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 886 (2016).
134 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (noting that the class representative is charged with
“fairly and adequately protect[ing] the interests of the class”).
135 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (class representative’s claims must be “typical” of the claims
of the class).
136 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
137 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).  In a private damages class action, notice is required to
be the “best notice that is practicable under the circumstances” which is generally individ-
ual notice “to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Id.  This is in
contrast to the notice required in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, which only requires
“appropriate notice” to be given to the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
138 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(vii).  Courts may require that class members have
another opportunity to opt out once they know the proposed terms of the settlement. FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4).
139 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring a finding that the “class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy”).
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must be appointed by the court.140  The court is required to consider several
factors in appointing class counsel including counsel’s experience, knowl-
edge of applicable law, and the resources counsel can commit to represent-
ing the class.141  Courts are also required to approve class action settlements
but “only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and ade-
quate.”142  As part of the court’s review of the settlement, the court will deter-
mine whether the attorneys’ fees are reasonable.143
Class counsel plays a central role in class actions.  Class counsel repre-
sents the interests of the entire class, not solely the interests of the class repre-
sentative or a certain subset of the class.144  Lead counsel has an “obligation
to act fairly, efficiently, and economically in the interests of all parties and
parties’ counsel.”145  Class counsel “act[s] for the [class] either personally or
by coordinating the efforts of others . . . in presenting written and oral argu-
ments” to the court, developing a litigation plan, conducting discovery, and
negotiating a settlement.146
There may be many lawyers at the outset of the litigation vying for the
role of lead counsel.  Intense competition often occurs among lawyers to be
appointed class counsel, since it is “an appointment that may implicitly prom-
ise large fees and a prominent role in the litigation.”147  Lawyers may also
collaborate among themselves and make proposals to the court for the
appointment of lead counsel.148  Committees of counsel, such as executive
committees, may also be formed when class “members’ interests and posi-
tions are sufficiently dissimilar to justify giving them representation in deci-
sion making.”149
Large class actions have developed into highly evolved structures with
the participation of many attorneys.150  “The dominant class action model is
a pyramid-shaped structure comprised of numerous small law firms.”151
There may be multiple lead counsel at the top of the pyramid.152  Other
140 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1).
141 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(A).
142 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).  Classes may also be certified at the same time that they are
settled. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment.  In these
settlement classes, certifying the class and approving the settlement occur at the same time,
so class members generally receive one notice of both the certification and the proposed
terms of the settlement. Id.
143 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
144 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4).
145 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.22 (2004).
146 Id. § 10.221.
147 Id. § 10.224.
148 See id. § 22.62; Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note 125, at 249–50.
149 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221.
150 See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 147–49 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter Gilles & Friedman, Class Action Myth] (“The class action bar is a highly evolved
organism.”).
151 Id. at 148.
152 See id.; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221.
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lawyers in the pyramid have less significant responsibilities, with attorneys on
the lowest strata of the pyramid doing the “yeoman’s work” of the litigation
such as document review.153  This structure enables an “ad hoc consortia of
entrepreneurial lawyers to tackle massive litigation projects.”154  Lawyers in
class actions typically have fee agreements among participating lawyers on
how the fees and expenses will be shared among the lawyers working on a
class action.155
Large class actions may also have multiple subclasses, with each subclass
being represented by its own attorney.156  Class action settlements may thus
be subject to bargaining among many attorneys, whether it is bargaining for a
greater compensation for a subclass or attorneys bargaining for a greater
share of the attorneys’ fees.157
The class action is a unique form of aggregate litigation that allows for
compensation and deterrence to be achieved more economically.  However,
it also alters the relationship between the attorney and client in a class action.
The relationship of class counsel to the class has led to a powerful agency cost
critique of class actions.
2. Agency Cost Critique of Class Actions
Private class actions have receded under recent judicial and legislative
pressure.158  The Supreme Court has increasingly interpreted the procedural
requirements in class actions to make them more difficult to bring.159  This
153 Gilles & Friedman, Class Action Myth, supra note 150, at 149.
154 Id. at 148.
155 Id. at 139–51.
156 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5), 23(g)(1); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 627 (1997) (quoting In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 743 (2d
Cir. 1992), modified on reh’g 993 F.2d 7 (1993)) (requiring subclassing for greater class
cohesion under the commonality certification requirements); Coffee, Class Action Accounta-
bility, supra note 7, at 374.
157 Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 7, at 397–98.
158 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5(b), 119 Stat. 4, 12 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)) (allowing the removal of most significant class filings to fed-
eral court); Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness
Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 403–04 (“The class action concept is under assault.
Critics seem to have won the day. . . .  In this climate, it is difficult to find a positive spin on
either Rule 23 or the class action mechanism itself.”); Brunet, supra note 4, at 1920 (stating
“[t]hese are not happy times for the class action mechanism” because Supreme Court cases
have “cast a pall over the device”); Cox, supra note 14, at 2314–17 (noting that class actions
are receding under judicial and legislative pressure); Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra
note 7, at 658 (stating that “[c]lass actions are on the ropes”); Robert H. Klonoff, The
Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 745, 823 (2013) (surveying many ways
courts and legislatures have weakened the private class action).
159 For example, the Supreme Court has tightened the requirements for class certifica-
tion. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013) (heightening the predomi-
nance requirement for certification); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–352
(2011) (heightening the requirement of commonality in class action certification inquiry
under Rule 23(a)(2)).  The Court has also upheld the enforceability of arbitration clauses
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movement has been fueled in part by the long-recognized agency problems
that arise in class actions that “prevent [their] efficiency and beg for serious
reform.”160
The dominant critique of class actions emerged from Professor John
Coffee who observed that “[h]igh agency costs” inherent in class action litiga-
tion “permit opportunistic behavior by attorneys” and “as a result, it is more
accurate as a descriptive matter to view the attorney as an independent entre-
preneur than as an agent of the client.”161  Attorneys and clients operate in a
principal-agent relationship where attorneys act as the agents for their princi-
pal-clients.162  Agency costs are “the costs a principal incurs to ensure his
agent remains loyal and the costs incurred from agent disloyalty that is not
worth preventing.”163  Agency costs exist in any attorney-client relationship,
but they are particularly problematic in class actions where class members
have little incentive or ability to monitor class counsel.164  Common agency
costs that arise in class actions include conflicts of interest, lack of monitor-
ing, and asymmetry of resources.165
First, conflicts of interest between the class and the class counsel
increase the agency costs in class actions.  There is an inherent conflict
between the class who has an interest in maximizing recoveries and class
counsel who has an interest in maximizing fees.166  This conflict exists in all
attorney-client relationships, but traditional clients have greater ability and
incentives to monitor their attorneys and that reduces this source of agency
costs.167  But in class actions, this conflict of interest often manifests itself in
early, inadequate settlements or “sweetheart settlements” that are structured
to provide large fees to counsel and paltry compensation to class
members.168
Different compensation models attempt to align the interests of the class
with class counsel and reduce agency costs, but in practice they create incen-
containing class action waivers in standard form contracts. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231–38 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
333, 344 (2011); see also Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 7, at 639–60 (discussing
the impacts of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion on the future of class actions); Vairo, supra
note 71, at 479 (“It is no secret that the United States Supreme Court has made obtaining
class certification and group dispute resolution more difficult.”).
160 Brunet, supra note 4, at 1929; see Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 7, at
379; Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 7, at 626–27.
161 Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 6, at 628.
162 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 518.
163 Beach, supra note 39, at 466.  Professor Coffee provides a more nuanced explana-
tion but centers on the same concepts. See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 5,
at 883 (discussing that agency costs “consist of (1) the costs of monitoring the agent, (2)
the costs the agent incurs to advertise or guarantee his fidelity (‘bonding’ costs), and (3)
the residual costs of opportunistic behavior that it is not cost-efficient to prevent”).
164 See Beach, supra note 39, at 468–69.
165 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 512–30.
166 See id. at 512.
167 See Beach, supra note 39, at 468.
168 Id. at 473.
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tives that exacerbate the potential for conflicts of interest.169  In class actions,
counsel typically plays two conflicting roles as both financier of the litigation
and agent of the class.170  Regardless of the compensation model, counsel
pays the upfront costs of litigation and only is compensated once the plaintiff
recovers.  Financing litigation is a powerful incentive for attorneys to settle,
and settle early, in order to recover their fees instead of expending addi-
tional resources to litigate to trial and risk not recovering any fees at all.171
The traditional compensation model for class actions is a percentage of
the recovery payment formula.  It operates like a contingency fee, providing
counsel a percentage of the class’s recovery.172  The attorney’s fee in this
model is usually fifteen to thirty percent of the overall class recovery.173  This
model theoretically aligns the interests of the attorney and class since the
attorney earns a greater fee if the class gets a higher recovery.  But, in prac-
tice, conflicts of interest arise when attorneys’ fees are a percentage of the
recovery, which creates incentives for counsel to agree to early, inadequate
settlements.
For example, attorneys may be better off accepting a smaller fee if it
does not require the lawyer to expend time and resources litigating, even if a
higher recovery is in the client’s best interest.174  With potentially one-third
of the recovery on the line, class counsel has a much larger stake in the out-
come of the litigation than any individual class member.175  As a result, the
attorney may be more risk averse than class members and willing to agree to
an early settlement on the rationale that a “juicy bird in the hand is worth
more than the vision of a much larger one in the bush.”176  Counsel is incen-
tivized to couple a high caseload with little investment in each case to spread
the risk over multiple cases.  This strategy is efficient because a high volume
of cases may give the attorney “a greater certainty of the same economic
reward through multiple small settlements than does an equivalent invest-
ment of time in a single action of greater merit.”177
169 See Beach, supra note 39, at 487–92 (discussing how compensation models create
conflicts of interest that increase agency costs); Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note
125, at 247 (discussing how the lodestar compensation formula creates incentives for collu-
sive and inadequate settlements).
170 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1275 (2012).
171 See id. at 1275–76.
172 See Beach, supra note 39, at 487–88.
173 John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 288, 292 (2010).
174 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 44 (noting, for example, “where the attorney
earns a percentage of the judgment, the attorney has an incentive to settle early at a rela-
tively low figure in order to maximize her profit”).
175 See Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note 125, at 230–31 (describing the class
attorney as the real party of interest in a class action lawsuit rather than class members).
176 Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964), aff’d on reh’g en banc by an
equally divided court, 340 F.2d 311, 312 (2d Cir. 1965); see Coffee, Private Attorney General,
supra note 125, at 230 n.34.
177 Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note 125, at 231.
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Conflicts of interest also arise where counsel agrees to a “sweetheart set-
tlement” that sells out the interests of class members for high attorneys’ fees
in a settlement.178  There is potential for collusion between class counsel and
defendants to negotiate for little-to-no compensation for class members but
pay high attorneys’ fees in the settlement.179  These settlements include
highly criticized “coupon settlements” where class members are given “cou-
pons” for products or services, while counsel is compensated with large attor-
neys’ fees.180
Class members are poorly situated to monitor class counsel to reduce
agency costs that result in adequate settlements.  First, individual class mem-
bers have little incentive to monitor class counsel.  The stake in the litigation
for each individual class member is so low that it is not in the economic
interest of class members to actively monitor counsel.181  Second, there is a
collective action problem for the class to monitor counsel.  There can be
thousands of class members, and the coordination costs of getting so many
class members to act in concert to monitor counsel is a tremendous hurdle
for class members.182  Third, class members are not procedurally empowered
to effectively monitor counsel.  Class counsel represents the entire class and
not individual class members, so individual class members cannot direct the
actions of class counsel.183  Even the class representative is limited in this
respect, and neither class members nor the class representative can fire class
counsel.184  Inability of the class to monitor counsel increases agency costs
and the potential for inadequate settlements.
Asymmetrical stakes in class action litigation between class members and
corporate defendants also increases the potential for inadequate settlements.
Corporate defendants stand to lose more than any individual class member
or even class counsel has to gain.185  This asymmetry exists because the
potential loss for the defendant represents the sum of all the class members’
claims and class counsel’s fee.186  Corporate defendants also pay their own
counsel’s fees and have high discovery costs.  In addition, corporations face
potential reputational damage from class actions.187  As a result, class action
defendants typically are “willing to litigate more vigorously, expend more
resources, pursue more collateral matters, and in general to seek to exploit
this differential in their relative willingness to invest in the action.”188
178 See Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 6, at 633.
179 See Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note 125, at 243–44.
180 See Koniak, supra note 6, at 1151–52; Koniak & Cohen, supra note 6, at 1053–54.
181 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 519.
182 See Beach, supra note 39, at 469.
183 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 519.
184 See Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 7, at 417–18 (stating class counsel
cannot be fired by class members (or even the class representative)).
185 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 522.
186 Id.; see also Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note 125, at 232–33, 247.
187 See Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical
Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2221–22 (2010).
188 Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 6, at 636.
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“The best [strategy] for class counsel, unwilling or unable to keep pace
with the defendant’s [expenditures], is . . . to settle the case” early.189  The
interests of defendants and class counsel align with an early settlement.190
Defendants can limit their liability early where more extensive discovery and
litigation may reveal a greater extent of the class’s injuries.  Early settlement
also saves the defendant litigation costs and cabins potential reputational
damage.  Class counsel can also benefit from an early settlement since they
are financing the litigation and can save time and resources by settling early.
These early settlements may come at the cost of a higher recovery for class
members who could benefit from more extensive discovery and litigation.
Agency problems also arise in the interactions among multiple lawyers
interacting with one another in representing the class to the detriment of
class members.  There are no practical means that a large class can use to
select or fire the class counsel.  “[M]ultiple attorneys volunteer to serve as
counsel to the class by filing separate parallel actions.  These actions are then
consolidated by the courts, and in the complex bargaining process that nec-
essarily follows to choose the lead counsel,” the fees are divided among multi-
ple counsel and thus diluted.191  Common pool agency problems may arise
when multiple plaintiffs’ attorneys vie for position in the class action pyra-
mid.192  When there are attorneys competing for fees in a class action, some
attorneys may “‘free ride’ off the efforts” of other attorneys “because they
perceive little incentive to overinvest their time into this common pool” when
the amount of fees they will recover is unclear.193  However, if no one is
incentivized to invest in investigating and litigating the action, attorneys are
more inclined to settle early, leading to inadequate settlements for class
members.194
Agency costs have been considered in private class actions; however, the
literature is beginning to consider how the agency cost critique applies to AG
actions.  The next Part discusses how multistate actions resemble class actions
on two distinct levels, such that they can be characterized as class action
squared.
II. MULTISTATE ACTION AS CLASS ACTION SQUARED
Scholars are just beginning to explore the similarities between AG
actions and private class actions; however, these conversations have not con-
sidered their similarities in light of the recent increase in multistate actions.
Multistate actions reveal that not only do private class actions closely resem-
ble AG actions, but also that they have attributes of class actions on two dis-
tinct levels.  On the first level, AGs aggregate claims on behalf of their states’
189 Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 522.
190 See Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note 125, at 232–33.
191 Id. at 233.
192 See Brunet, supra note 4, at 1930; Coffee, Private Attorney General, at 232–33.
193 Brunet, supra note 4, at 1930 (citing Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 8 n.5).
194 See id. at 1920–21.
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residents like a private class action.195  When AGs join together in multistate
actions, a second layer of “class action” emerges.  In this second “class
action,” states aggregate their collective claims along with the combined
claims of their state residents with a few AGs leading the action.  This means
multistate actions are made up of two discrete layers, each resembling private
class actions.  In other words, multistate action is class action squared.
A. The First Layer of “Class Action”
The first layer of the multistate action that resembles a class action is the
individual parens patriae action an AG brings on behalf of state residents.
This first layer shares similar attributes and objectives with private class
actions.  Both types of actions aggregate claims and seek to compensate inju-
ries and deter future wrongdoing.  They are both a response to situations
where misconduct perpetuates widely diffusive injuries but produces low-
value individual claims.196
Both private class actions and parens patriae actions share similar attrib-
utes by aggregating numerous, similar claims into a single action.  For exam-
ple, class actions must meet procedural requirements of commonality and
numerosity in order to be certified as a class.197  The common-law parens
patriae doctrine also requires “numerosity” in the sense that the AG’s action
must involve a “sufficiently substantial segment of [the state’s] popula-
tion.”198  And parens patriae actions also have a form of “commonality” since
they generally arise from the same set of facts, share a similar legal theory,
and are brought against the same defendant.199
Even though parens patriae and class actions have similar attributes,
parens patriae actions lack the procedural protections provided in class
actions.200  For example, class members are provided individual notice of the
action and the ability to opt out of the class.201  Courts play a role in
appointing class counsel and approving settlements they enter into on behalf
of the class.202  These protections allow class members to protect themselves
by preserving their claims and provide judicial oversight to protect the class’s
interests.  But such protections are noticeably absent in parens patriae
195 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 488.
196 See Brunet, supra note 4, at 1922 (“The nature of these suits is to achieve broad
compensation, to deter wrongful conduct by one or more defendants, and to focus on
injuries to a large set of state citizens.”).
197 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
198 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
199 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 502 (“And, while courts assessing
claims of parens patriae authority do not make any explicit inquiry into commonality, the
fact that the state must assert an injury to the members of the parens patriae group—the
equivalent of a Rule 23 ‘class’—effectively ensures that there will be some legal or factual
questions common to the group.”).
200 Id. at 489.
201 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).
202 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), (g).
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actions where group members generally do not receive notice or the oppor-
tunity to opt out, and there is scant court supervision of settlements.203
The relationship between counsel and “class members” is also similar in
class actions and parens patriae actions.  Both class counsel and AGs are
charged with representing the interests of a large group of people with whom
they lack a traditional attorney-client relationship.  In both types of action,
counsel recruits their “clients” instead of the client hiring the attorney like in
a traditional attorney-client relationship.  Class counsel often directly recruits
clients to be members of a class.  Class counsel is ultimately appointed by a
court and not directly chosen by class members.  In parens patriae actions,
AGs use their enforcement discretion to choose which cases to pursue, which
in essence allows them to recruit their “clients” for any given action.204  In
both instances, the attorneys step into the role of the principal, making
important decisions on behalf of their clients instead of carrying out specific
client directives.
In both types of actions, the client has little ability to monitor or control
his or her attorney during the course of the litigation.  In class actions, class
members do not hire and cannot fire class counsel.205  The class is a large
group of people who are geographically dispersed and have little meaningful
contact with class counsel.206  Similarly, the AG represents a large group of
injured state residents who have little ability to monitor the AG’s behavior in
parens patriae actions.  Democratic elections are not an effective means of
monitoring for parens patriae group members.  This is because parens
patriae members are a discrete subset of the state electorate and alone are
likely unable to “fire” the AG by electing someone else in the next elec-
tion.207  Further, by the time the next election cycle rolls around, the action
will likely be settled, making it difficult to hold the AG accountable for a
specific settlement.208  Because the AG was elected to perform a host of func-
tions and was elected based on a wide range of policy preferences, it is
unlikely that an election is a means of monitoring behavior in a particular
lawsuit.209  Like class members, parens patriae members do not “hire” the
AG like a traditional client, nor can they fire her at will.  This lack of control
increases the potential for agency costs.
Conflicts of interest are a type of agency cost that occur in both types of
actions that yield inadequate settlements.210  AGs face unique conflicts of
203 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 504, 507–08.
204 See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999
SUP. CT. REV. 337, 341 (“Class actions almost invariably come into being through the
actions of lawyers—in effect, it is the agents who create the principals . . . .”); Lemos,
Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 488–89.
205 See Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 7, at 418 (stating class counsel can-
not be fired by class members (even the class representative)).
206 See Beach, supra note 39, at 469.
207 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 520–22.
208 See id. at 521.
209 See infra Section IV.A (discussing voter monitoring of AG enforcement actions).
210 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 511.
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interest, even if they are purely motivated by the public good.  Many conflicts
of interest can arise for AGs by virtue of the fact that they represent the inter-
ests of many different “clients.”211  AGs represent the interests of the state,
injured parens patriae group members, and the general public.212  AGs must
weigh those competing interests in negotiating a settlement.213  For example,
AGs must consider the interests of the state, general public, and parens
patriae group members in determining the balance between injunctive relief,
civil penalties, and public compensation.214  It may be that the state would
prefer higher civil penalties, the general public would prefer stricter injunc-
tive relief, and parens patriae group members would prefer greater public
compensation.  These conflicts arise by virtue of AGs’ unique role represent-
ing multiple “clients.”215
AGs may also have political ambitions that potentially create conflicts of
interest.216  An AG may be tempted to favor a quick settlement that draws a
splashy headline just in time for elections over lengthier litigation that would
produce greater public compensation.217  An AG may also be tempted to
favor the interests of corporate campaign donors and lobbyists over the inter-
est of injured state residents.218  Favoring donors and lobbyists may increase
campaign donations for future elections but doing so risks undercompensat-
ing injured state residents.219  This conflict is similar to the conflict class
counsel faces to “sell out” the interests of the class to pursue a higher fee
award.220
The debate in the literature over the analogy between class actions and
public compensation is fundamentally about the role of  public and private
enforcement.  Some scholars argue that public enforcers seeking compensa-
tion are serving the same role or mimicking private enforcers, whose role
traditionally has been to compensate private injuries.221  To the extent that
public enforcers are serving the same purpose as private enforcers, inade-
quate settlements are an important concern, especially if public settlements
211 See Marshall, supra note 29, at 2455–57.
212 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 511–16.
213 See id. at 513 (arguing conflicts of interests exist when AGs represent the state,
injured parens patriae group members, and the general public interests).
214 See Cox, supra note 14, at 2352.
215 See Marshall, supra note 29, at 2462–63 (“[T]he [AG’s] role is significantly more
complex than that of a private attorney . . . . [D]ual representation of a state entity and the
state or public interest is also not an ethical violation. . . .”).
216 See Provost, Aspiring Governor, supra note 40, at 597.
217 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. REV. 1855, 1870
(2015) (“[P]ublic officials might exchange a rapid settlement with splashy headlines for
insubstantial contributions to victims.”).
218 See Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2014, at A1.
219 Id.; see Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 514–16.
220 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 515–16.
221 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 37, 861–63; Zimmerman, supra note 68, at 554–55.
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preclude subsequent private action.222  Others, however, view public and pri-
vate enforcement as distinct, with public enforcement serving the public
good and private enforcement seeking compensation for private rights.223
Inadequate compensation is less concerning under this approach because
public enforcers can use their discretion to trade off among a variety of reme-
dies in the public interest, especially if subsequent private action is not
precluded.224
As AGs are increasingly stepping into the domain of private enforcers to
compensate private injuries in parens patriae actions, there is reason for con-
cern about inadequate settlements.  Scholars have raised concerns about the
preclusive effects of parens patriae actions on subsequent private action.225
Some courts have found that parens patriae actions have preclusive effects
depending on the type of law at issue226 and the remedy being sought.227
Certain states also have statutes that prohibit subsequent private action if
state residents receive restitution in parens patriae actions.228  There are also
222 In fact, Professor Lemos argues that inadequate representation in parens patriae
actions that result in preclusion rise to the level of constitutional Due Process violations.
See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 510–11, 540.
223 See Cox, supra note 14, at 2315–16.
224 See id. at 2337, 2350.
225 Professor Lemos has argued that even though the case law is “surprisingly sparse,
the prevailing view is that the judgment in a state case is binding ‘on every person whom
the state represents as parens patriae.’”  Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 500
(quoting Farmer, supra note 10, at 384); see also Burch, supra note 217, at 1924 (“Preclud-
ing private suits in the wake of a parens patriae action can be particularly problematic since
those suits have not been subjected to Rule 23’s adequacy requirement and attorneys gen-
eral may prioritize political agendas and quick resolution over private claimants’ inter-
ests.”); Davis, supra note 10, at 41 (stating that “substitute suits,” such as state actions
seeking public compensation, preclude later private claims and “may wrest control of pri-
vate rights from an individual beneficiary without the procedures that protect a benefici-
ary’s right to her day in court”).
226 For example, in the antitrust context, parens patriae actions under certain federal
antitrust statutes provide preclusive effects.  Cox, supra note 14, at 2330.  State courts have
also found preclusive effects of state antitrust law. See Bonovich v. Convenient Food Mart,
Inc., 310 N.E.2d 710, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (holding unsuccessful parens patriae action
by attorney general under state antitrust statute precluded private antitrust action against
the same defendant since “the Attorney General’s action . . . was brought on behalf of all
the people in the state . . . who were adversely affected by the alleged antitrust violations”).
That being said, antitrust parens patriae actions often have greater procedural require-
ments than other types of parens patriae actions. See Cox, supra note 14, at 2329–31.
227 Courts have also held that parens patriae actions have precluded subsequent claims
for punitive damages. See Fabiano v. Philip Morris Inc., 54 A.D.3d 146, 150–53 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549, 553–54 (Ga.
2006) (“The State’s release of its punitive damages claim as parens patriae precludes plain-
tiffs from pursuing the same claim for punitive damages in this action.”).
228 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 487-12 (2019) (“[T]he consumer’s acceptance and full
performance of restitution shall bar recovery of any other damages in any action on
account of the same acts or practices by the consumer against the person or persons mak-
ing restitution.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-9 (2020) (stating that a person’s “acceptance of
restitution bars recovery of any damages in any action by him or on his behalf against the
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instances where the effect of a parens patriae action may effectively preclude
private causes of action and specifically class actions.229  Inadequate settle-
ments are particularly problematic if parens patriae actions preclude private
action because state residents may be “stuck” with inadequate compensation
without receiving the procedural protections that class members receive
before being bound to a settlement.230
If, however, concerns about preclusion are overstated and private
enforcement can be relied upon to compensate adequately, there is still rea-
son to be troubled about agency problems that produce inadequate compen-
sation in parens patriae actions.  Even if state residents have the option to
pursue private action because public compensation is inadequate, they may
only realistically be left with the option of a class action.  Class actions as a
mechanism are being restricted by courts and Congress, which make them a
difficult avenue to rely upon for compensation.231  At the same time, they are
also heavily critiqued for being subject to agency costs that produce inade-
quate compensation.  Relying on private enforcement, and in particular class
actions, is not a cure-all for inadequate compensation in parens patriae
actions.
Furthermore, even if private rights are preserved, state residents may not
exercise them based on a potentially mistaken belief that they have received
all the compensation they deserve because a public settlement carries with it
the imprimatur of government approval.  It may be that state residents have
greater faith in their AGs to negotiate a fair settlement, and they may not
exercise their private rights based on that assumption.232  Thus, the existence
of public compensation in a settlement, even if it does not preclude private
same defendant on account of the same unlawful practice”).  In contrast, other state stat-
utes specifically preserve private rights. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-107 (2020)
(“Assurance of voluntary compliance shall in no way affect individual rights of action which
may exist independent of the recovery of money or property received pursuant to a stipula-
tion in voluntary compliance . . . .”).
229 For example, class actions may not be certified because a court may consider a
parens patriae action to be “superior” to class actions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Cox,
supra note 14, at 2369–74; Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 531.  Another exam-
ple is when AGs may negotiate settlements that require parens patriae members to waive
their rights to private action as a condition of receiving compensation, which precludes
subsequent private action. See Cox, supra note 14, at 2374–79.
230 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 489; Zimmerman, supra note 68, at
527.
231 See Burch, supra note 217, at 1856 (“Certifying fewer classes also seemingly corre-
lates with increased public regulation through state attorneys’ parens patriae power.”).
232 Indeed, Professor Cox raises a similar concern in the context of required releases,
namely that release comes with “the government enforcer’s implicit encouragement to
accept.”  Cox, supra note 14, at 2375.  And that the public nature of the settlement makes it
more credible that the relief is adequate compared to the consequence of released claims.
See id.
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action, may practically preclude or prevent state residents from exercising
private rights.233
The debate over the analogy of public enforcement actions to class
actions has important implications for AG actions seeking public compensa-
tion.  The debate, however, has failed to consider the increasing trend of
multistate actions.  Multistate actions reveal a second layer that also resem-
bles class actions.
B. The Second Layer of “Class Action”
A second layer of “class action” emerges when states pursue multistate
action together.  Multistate actions, like class actions, are an efficient means
of aggregating the claims of many states together to hold large corporations
accountable for misconduct.  Individual AG offices have limited budgets and
many enforcement priorities.234  Enforcement actions against large corpora-
tions are expensive and time-consuming endeavors.235  Large corporate
targets often have deep pockets and are willing to expend significant
resources to defend enforcement actions.  This asymmetry of resources may
make an action “uneconomical” for individual states.  But multistate action
levels the playing field by allowing states to pool their resources.236  By facili-
tating actions where it would be uneconomical otherwise, multistate actions
hold corporations accountable for misconduct that individual states could
not on their own.237
This second layer resembles the characteristics of private class actions.
First, like class actions, participating AGs aggregate the claims of their state
residents together in multistate actions.  These combined parens patriae
group members resemble class members who do not direct or meaningfully
233 The public may trust public settlements more than private settlements because
there is some evidence that “participation rates in public settlements can be substantially
higher than in class action cases requiring filed claims.” Id.  Class actions often have partic-
ipation of less than five percent, even in opt-out cases where the potential recipient’s
claims will be released regardless of participation in the class settlement.  Gail Hillebrand
& Daniel Torrence, Claims Procedures in Large Consumer Class Actions and Equitable Distribu-
tion of Benefits, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 747, 751–54 (1988).  In contrast, public compensa-
tion settlements often have much higher participation rates. See, e.g., Thornton v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 1:06-cv-0018, 2006 WL 3359482, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 17,
2006) (approximately thirty-nine percent acceptance rate).
234 See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 7, at 668 (describing AG offices as
“[c]hronically underfunded”).
235 Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys Gen-
eral in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 2005 (2001).
236 Id. at 2003–04.
237 See Thomas A. Schmeling, Stag Hunting with the State AG: Anti-Tobacco Litigation and
the Emergence of Cooperation Among State Attorneys General, 25 LAW & POL’Y 429, 430 (2003)
(“Acting together, the [state attorneys general] have won legal settlements or concessions
from tobacco companies, auto manufacturers, toy makers, paint producers, and others,
agreements that would have been quite unlikely if sought by individual [state attorneys
general] acting alone.”).
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participate in the multistate action.  Second, the combined parens patriae
group members from many states are numerous, like the class members in a
class action.  Indeed, the combined parens patriae groups from many states
have been described as “what may amount to a nationwide class of claim-
ants.”238  The claims are also similar across state parens patriae groups
because the claims generally arise from the same misconduct committed by
the same corporation across state lines.239
As in private class actions, a small number of “entrepreneurial” AGs lead
multistate actions. 240  Like class counsel, these leading AGs often recruit
other states to participate in multistate actions to enlarge the “class.”241  They
also play the most important role in directing multistate actions and negotiat-
ing the settlement just as class counsel do in the private class action con-
text.242  Leading AGs develop a pyramid structure to manage multistate
actions to involve multiple lawyers and organize complex litigation similar to
the organization of class actions.243  Like class counsel, leading AGs in multis-
tate actions sit on the top of the pyramid and direct an “ad hoc law firm” of
other counsel who contribute to the action in varying degrees.244  Just as
there may be multiple lead counsels in a private class action, there are often
multiple AGs leading the multistate action at the top of the pyramid.245  Also
similar to class actions, leading AGs may form an executive committee to lead
litigation, or there may be a small number of AGs working together.246
In class actions, lead counsel directs other attorneys in performing vari-
ous litigation tasks.247  Class counsel plays an important role in setting the
amount of compensation that the class will receive by virtue of counsel’s role
in negotiating a settlement.  Class counsel also negotiates and determines the
238 Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 523.
239 Lynch, supra note 235, at 2008.
240 See NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 26; Bowman, supra note 1, at 541–42; Cox et al., supra
note 106, at 52; Dishman, supra note 35, at 451–52 (citing NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 26);
Provost, supra note 16, at 1, 7, 10, 12; Totten, supra note 16, at 1660–61 (describing leading
AGs as entrepreneurial).
241 See NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 26; Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note 125, at
220, 223 (stating private class lawyers recruit class members).
242 See Totten, supra note 16, at 1656–57.
243 See Gilles & Friedman, Class Action Myth, supra note 150, at 147–50.
244 See id.; Lynch, supra note 235, at 2004, 2008.
245 See Lynch, supra note 235, at 2008 (“The attorneys general also share staff and the
costs incurred during the litigation, creating, in effect, a temporary law firm dedicated to a
single case that has more resources available to it than any individual office could commit
to the matter alone.”).
246 See id.
247 See Gilles & Friedman, Class Action Myth, supra note 150, at 148 (noting that class
actions use pyramid structure to “enabl[e] ad hoc consortia of entrepreneurial lawyers to
tackle massive litigation projects”); see also Richard A. Epstein, One Stop Law Shop, LEGAL
AFFS., Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 34, 37 (“Many large class-actions involving antitrust and consumer-
fraud issues, for example, are handled by ad hoc alliances among multiple firms that split their labor
and share the rewards of the litigation.”).
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fees for the other counsel that contribute to the class action.248  Like class
counsel, leading AGs can play a significant role both in determining compen-
sation for “class members” and “compensation” for each participating AG.
Leading AGs play an important role in the compensation for parens patriae
group members in multistate actions because they play the most significant
role in negotiating and allocating settlements.  Parens patriae group mem-
bers may receive public compensation through allocations to their state or
through a “global fund” set up by the settlement, with distributions super-
vised by a monitor.249  Leading AGs who negotiate the settlement also make
important decisions about the balance between requiring corporations to
make reforms and paying civil penalties and/or public compensation in set-
tlements.250  This balance affects the amount of public compensation that
parens patriae group members will receive.
Even though an AG does not personally profit from a settlement, AGs’
offices may receive a portion of the settlement in certain states.251  An AG’s
“compensation” may ride on the amount allocated to her state if a state pro-
vides an AG’s office a percentage of the funds they obtained from enforce-
ment settlements.252  These revolving funds can be an important part of an
AG’s office budget.  Increasing the budget of the AG’s office has tangible
benefits to the AG such as more staff and resources to pursue her enforce-
ment agenda and propel her political ambition.253  The larger the portion of
the settlement that is allocated to an AG’s state, the greater the potential
political “compensation” the AG receives in the form of increased publicity
and opportunities for reputation building.254  For ambitious AGs, this form
of “compensation” may be particularly valuable heading into an election
cycle.255
Both class counsel in private class actions and leading AGs in multistate
actions have unique relationships with their “clients.”  Neither class counsel
nor AGs are “hired” by their “clients” in the usual way that clients hire their
lawyers.  Like class counsel, leading AGs are also largely self-selecting, often
by virtue of being the first to instigate an enforcement action.256  While a
leading AG is directly elected by her own state electorate, parens patriae
group members from other participating states do not elect the leading AG
and thus have no power to “fire” leading AGs.  Furthermore, other AGs that
248 See Gilles & Friedman, Class Action Myth, supra note 150, at 148–49.
249 For example, the National Mortgage Settlement involved the payment of public
compensation by the defendants as supervised by a monitor. See Joseph A. Smith, Jr., A
Review and Assessment of the National Mortgage Settlement by Its Monitor, 21 N.C. BANKING INST.
29, 35–36 (2017).
250 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 526–27.
251 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 37, at 856.
252 See id. at 866.
253 See id. at 871.
254 See id. at 871, 892–93.
255 See Provost, Aspiring Governor, supra note 40, at 597 (“AGs who are active in multis-
tate litigation are also likely to run for higher office.”).
256 See Cox et al., supra note 106, at 84.
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participate in the action also cannot “fire” the leading AGs or the executive
committee, just as other attorneys participating in a class action cannot uni-
laterally replace class counsel.  AGs can either seek a greater role in directing
the litigation or “opt out” of multistate litigation altogether if they are dissat-
isfied with the direction of multistate litigation.257
That being said, “opting out” of multistate action and pursuing action
independently may be easier in theory than in practice.  States that tend to
lead multistate actions are usually highly populous states with greater AG
office resources.258  For states with fewer resources, the choice may be to
accept a settlement that required little to no public resources or face the
political consequences of passing up settlement money.259  Because only
states that participate in the multistate action get a portion of the settlement
and the settlement will likely occur regardless of an individual AG’s participa-
tion, AGs may participate “to get a share of the settlement proceeds even if
they disagree with the underlying legal theories” of the lawsuit or are dissatis-
fied with the settlement.260  Furthermore, states with fewer resources may not
pose a credible litigation threat to large corporate defendants that can vastly
outspend AG offices, which means that defendants may offer lower settle-
ments or not come to the settlement table if an under-resourced AG’s office
pursues action alone.261
While AGs have a decision, albeit perhaps difficult, to “opt out” of multi-
state litigation, parens patriae group members generally don’t get to make
that decision directly for themselves.262  In multistate actions, parens patriae
groups may be two steps removed from decisionmaking in multistate actions.
On the first level, they are removed because the state is the named plaintiff in
the AG’s action, not the state residents.263  On the second level, it may be
another state’s AG playing the leading role in the action and not their own
AG, making it even more difficult to control the action via democratic means.
When the difficulty of monitoring increases, so does the potential for agency
257 See Richard Lawson, Insights from State AG Coordinated Opioid Investigation, LAW360
(June 18, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1052878/ (discussing states pulling out
of the multistate opioid investigation).
258 See Bowman, supra note 1, at 540–41 (noting that the most active “core” group of
leading states are large states).
259 See NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 28.
260 Id. at 28 (“This dynamic explains why, for example, Alabama AG William Pryor, a
conservative Republican and consistent critic of his fellow AGs’ use of litigation to regulate
the tobacco industry, nevertheless signed the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998.”);
Provost, supra note 16, at 20 (using the example of the master tobacco agreement and
arguing that we can “infer that AGs from conservative states will stick by free-market princi-
ples, but if the target becomes too tempting, they will rush in to claim their share of the
reward as well”).
261 See Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 35, at 705. R
262 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 507–08.
263 See, e.g., Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 667, 670 (9th Cir. 2012); Con-
necticut v. Moody’s Corp., No. 10-cv-546, 2011 WL 63905, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 5, 2011).
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costs, and multistate actions introduce new agency problems by virtue of
being class action squared.
III. CLASS ACTION SQUARED AGENCY PROBLEMS
Scholars have long recognized that private class actions give rise to
agency problems when the interests of class counsel diverge from the inter-
ests of class members.264  This critique has been applied to parens patriae
actions led by AGs.265  But no one has considered the unique agency costs
that arise in multistate actions by virtue of being class action squared.  Class
action squared does not simply double agency problems.  Rather, an entirely
new set of agency costs arises because two layers of “class action” interact with
one another.  Put more simply, AGs can borrow and steal in multistate
actions in ways they could not if they were pursuing action alone.  Class
action squared agency dilemmas undermine the ability of multistate actions
to compensate injuries and deter future wrongdoing.  They also call into
question whether multistate action is always better than states going at it
alone.
A. Borrow
The temptation to “borrow” other states’ more expansive enforcement
statutes is a type of class action squared problem.  States that lead multistate
actions may have particularly strong state statutes or expansive investigatory
powers.  Strong state enforcement statutes provide leading states with lever-
age to bring large corporations to the settlement table.  For example, the
New York AG, who has broad enforcement and investigatory authority under
New York state law, leads multistate actions more often than any other state
AG.266  That power gives other states, and even federal agencies, the ability to
gain settlement benefits by joining forces with the New York AG.267  New
York’s Martin Act is so important to other states that other states have filed
amicus briefs in support of its expansive interpretation in New York state
court.268
264 See Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 7, at 371–72.
265 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 511–12.
266 In fact, New York leads at a rate of nearly twice the rate of the next most active state
leader. See NOLETTE, supra note 1, at 26–28; see also Jeff Izant, Note, Mens Rea and the
Martin Act: A Weapon of Choice for Securities Fraud Prosecutions?, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
913, 917–19, 927 (discussing New York’s expansive enforcement statute).
267 See Eric W. Zitzewitz, Prosecutorial Discretion in Mutual Fund Settlement Negotiations,
2003–7, 9 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, no. 1, 2009, at 1, 3 (arguing that settlement
amounts are greater when the New York Attorney General participates in an enforcement
action).
268 See Nina Hart, Note, Moving at a Glacial Pace: What Can State Attorneys General Do
About SEC Inattention to Nondisclosure of Financially Material Risks Arising from Climate Change?,
40 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 99, 138 (2015) (citing People ex rel. Cuomo v. Greenberg, 994
N.E.2d 839, 839–40 (N.Y. 2013)).
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Since corporations commonly settle multistate actions before meaning-
fully testing the legal basis for each state’s claims in court, states may “bor-
row” stronger laws from other states and “hide” their relatively weaker legal
claims by aggregating their claims with other states.  Borrowing on the
strength of others’ claims (or hiding weaker claims) is a common feature in
class actions.269  Just as class members can borrow from the strength of the
claims of other class members and “hide” their weaker claims in the class,
states can “borrow” the strength of other states’ enforcement statutes and
hide their potentially weaker legal claims in multistate actions.  In both
instances, states and class members with weaker claims can receive financial
settlements without facing the greater scrutiny that would likely occur if they
brought action alone.  Multistate actions rarely litigate the application of
each state’s law to the particular facts of the case.  Rather, multistate actions
are often settled relatively quickly without testing states’ legal theories in
court.
If states with weaker laws brought action alone instead of participating in
a multistate action, they would be forced to rely on their own statutes and
could not hide weaker claims among the claims of other states.  Corporations
would likely scrutinize the legal basis for an individual state’s claims more
closely and be willing to invest more resources in testing the claim in litiga-
tion.  This means it is likely that AGs will have to invest more resources to
obtain settlements that may be lower than the amounts that they could have
received had they been able to “borrow” in multistate litigation.
An example of “borrowing” in multistate litigation occurred in the Tar-
get multistate settlement.  A multistate investigation was initiated based on a
2013 data breach that occurred at Target during the holiday shopping season
that “affected more than 41 million customer payment card accounts and
exposed contact information for more than 60 million customers.”270  In a
press release announcing the settlement, the Colorado AG explicitly stated
that Colorado’s data breach and privacy laws are “so weak compared to other
states, we were unable to credibly take a leadership position in the litiga-
tion.”271  In fact, the AG announced that she would be convening a working
group “to . . . recommend more effective legislation” in the next legislative
session.272  However, without changing Colorado law, the Colorado AG was
able to participate in a multistate action and effectively “borrow” other states’
stronger data privacy laws and receive a portion of the settlement.  Colorado
269 See Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 7, at 398, 429 (referring to the R
problem of weak claims in class action as a pooling problem).
270 See New York Target Press Release, supra note 89.
271 See Press Release, Colo. Att’y Gen.’s Off., Attorney General Coffman Joins $18.5M
Settlement with Target Corporation Over 2013 Data Breach (May 24, 2017), https://stop
fraudcolorado.gov/sites/default/files/press/finalpress-may2017releasetargetsettlement.
pdf (“I will be convening a privacy working group this summer to research and recom-
mend more effective legislation in the 2018 session.  Colorado needs to move to the fore-
front in protecting consumers from theft of their personal information . . . .”).
272 Id.
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received $278,914 from the Target multistate settlement, which is similar to
amounts received by some similarly populated states that participated in the
action.273  Indeed, an AG participating in the Target settlement stated that
the settlement was allocated largely based on the population of participating
states.274  This means that a state’s population was likely a more important
factor in the allocating of the settlement than the legal strength of the state’s
claim.  By participating in the multistate action and “borrowing” other states’
stronger statutes, Colorado may have been able to obtain a larger settlement
than it could have if the state brought action alone.
In contrast, several AGs did not participate in a series of multistate
actions against Wall Street banks that securitized RMBS in the wake of the
financial crisis.  Despite the fact that these settlements were some of the larg-
est in American history, certain states that were hit hard by the recession such
as Nevada and Florida did not participate.275  These AGs stated their reason
for not participating was that they lacked the expansive enforcement statutes
of other states.276  These states did not engage in borrowing in the RMBS
actions, even though they potentially could have tried to “hide” their weaker
claims in with states with stronger enforcement statutes.
“Borrowing” is problematic as it allows AGs to circumnavigate their state
legislatures.  AGs may “borrow” other states’ more expansive law in contra-
vention of the balance struck by state legislatures.277  AGs can also encroach
on legislative and executive power when they strike settlements with corpora-
tions that create de facto regulations for the settling corporation and, by
extension, entire industries.278  AG “borrowing” in multistate actions raises
273 Id.  Colorado’s estimated 2013 population based on the 2010 census was 5,268,367,
and it received $278,914.  The next most populous state, Minnesota, had a population of
5,420,380 and received $283,736.  Missouri, also a similarly populated state with 6,044,171,
received $302,746. State Population Census Estimates: 2013 Births, Deaths, Migration Totals,
GOVERNING, https://www.governing.com/gov-data/census/census-state-population-esti-
mates-births-deaths-migration-totals-2013.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2020); Kavita Kumar,
Target Reaches $18.5 Million Settlement with States over Data Breach, STARTRIB. (May 23, 2017),
https://www.startribune.com/target-reaches-18-5-million-settlement-with-states-over-data-
breach/423880353/ (reporting settlement amount received by Minnesota); Steph
Kukuljan, Target Corp. to Pay Missouri $303,000 over 2013 Data Breach, ST. LOUIS BUS. J. (May
23, 2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/2017/05/23/target-corpto-pay-mis
souri-303-000-over-2013-data.html.
274 Abrams, supra note 89 (quoting New York AG Eric T. Schneiderman).
275 See Dan Freed, Florida, Nevada Can’t Win for Losing on Mortgage Crisis, STREET (Aug. 6,
2014), https://www.thestreet.com/story/12832469/1/florida-nevada-cant-win-for-losing-
on-mortgage-crisis.html (noting that Florida, Nevada, Arizona, and Michigan, all states hit
especially hard by the housing crisis, did not participate in the Citigroup or JPMorgan
settlements).
276 See id.
277 See Gifford, supra note 19, at 913, 919.
278 See id. at 920 (“This reallocation of a primary regulatory role to the state attorney
general is one not envisioned by state constitutions: the attorney general assumes a regula-
tory role traditionally regarded as belonging to the legislature and the administrative agen-
cies it creates for specific regulatory tasks.”).
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separation-of-power concerns by allowing the executive to encroach on tradi-
tional legislative powers to define law and regulate.279  It also highlights con-
cerns about a “divided executive” where AGs compete with executive
agencies’ ability to regulate.280
The temptation to “borrow” in multistate litigation behavior creates con-
flicts of interest for AGs.  For example, state legislatures may have made a
deliberate policy decision to create “weak” or narrower enforcement statutes.
If the AG’s “client” is the state, it may be in the state’s interests for AGs to
advance the balance struck by the state legislature.  This means that an AG
may have to forgo participating in an enforcement action because the state
lacks a strong legal basis to do so.  But the state’s interest in advancing its
state law may come at the expense of parens patriae group members who
have been injured by corporate misconduct and would like to receive public
compensation.  If the AG’s “client” is parens patriae group members, it is
likely in their interests to “borrow” from other states in order to get higher
settlements.  AGs face a conflict over whose interests to advance when faced
with the temptation to “borrow” in multistate actions.
Conflicts of interest also arise when AGs “borrow” in multistate litigation
to further their political ambitions.  AGs may care little about the balances
struck by state legislatures if participation in multistate settlements increases
electoral support.  A strategy of “borrowing” to advance the AGs’ political
ambitions, however, may also be at odds with securing the most relief for
injured state residents.  AGs who simply care about touting settlements in
press releases may “borrow” to participate in multistate settlements, but neg-
lect to monitor how the settlements are allocated.281  Other AGs may acqui-
esce or even encourage other states’ “borrowing” because leading a
multistate action may be politically advantageous, even if it potentially dilutes
a strong legal claim, and it may enable leading states to allocate to themselves
a greater portion of the settlement.
“Borrowing” has been recognized in the context of private class actions
and sub-classing has been used as a remedy for “borrowing” concerns.  In
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Supreme Court recognized that differences in the
legal or economic strength of class members’ claims may necessitate sub-
classing when class members live in different jurisdictions with substantive
laws that vary in their favorability to class members.282  In this instance, there
279 Id. at 913 (AGs “seek to supplant the regulatory regimes previously enacted by Con-
gress, the state legislature, or federal agencies with one that reflects their own visions”).
280 Marshall, supra note 29, at 2455. R
281 Indeed, there is evidence that government officials care more about announcing a
settlement than actually collecting it. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 37, at 883–86; see
also Burch, supra note 217, at 1870 (“[P]ublic officials might exchange a rapid settlement
with splashy headlines for insubstantial contributions to victims . . . .”); Ezra Ross & Martin
Pritikin, The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of Corporate and White-Collar Fines and Penalties,
29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 453, 468 (2011) (finding that federal agencies systematically fail to
collect the fines and penalties they impose).
282 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999); Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 7, at 387 R
n.43, 395 n.66.
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are questions about whether counsel may allocate a higher award to class
members in jurisdictions with more favorable laws (or subclass them) or aver-
age the awards regardless of the strength of the jurisdiction’s substantive
law.283  If the damage award is averaged, the class members in the jurisdic-
tion with the adverse laws will be “borrowing” from those in jurisdictions with
favorable laws to the detriment of those class members.  In the private class
action context, the danger of “borrowing” has been recognized to some
degree, and there is the potential remedy of sub-classing in these cases.284
In the context of multistate actions, “borrowing” raises similar concerns
about compensation.  Borrowing allows AGs in states with weaker legal claims
to have potentially larger settlements.  On the other side, however, states with
stronger legal claims may receive smaller settlements because the weaker
claims dilute the value of their claims.  But unlike class actions, “borrowing”
has not been recognized as a problem with a procedural protection of “sub-
classing” in multistate actions.
B. Steal
“Stealing” is another type of agency problem that exists by virtue of the
class action squared structure of multistate actions.  Stealing in the context of
multistate actions occurs when leading AGs allocate greater portions of a
multistate settlement to their respective states, regardless of the acuteness of
injury experienced in their states, to the detriment of other participating
states that have experienced greater harm.  Greater settlement amounts for
leading AGs not only brings more money to their home states, but also
increases reputational gains that may help leading AGs win future elec-
tions.285  Even though leading AGs are not compensated like class counsel,
they may be tempted to steal in multistate actions to benefit their own states
at the expense of other participating states.  This temptation is like how class
counsel is tempted to sell out the class for attorneys’ fees in a settlement.286
Leading states negotiate settlements and may allocate a greater amount
of the settlement to their own states.  In fact, multistate settlements often
name leading states and provide that those leading states will designate the
amounts allocated to each participating state.  For example, the Target multi-
state settlement provided that the leading states, Illinois and Connecticut,
had the authority to designate the amounts to be received by each participat-
ing state.287  Similarly, the Neiman Marcus multistate settlement names Illi-
283 See Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 7, at 387–88. R
284 See id.
285 AGs frequently tout their leadership roles in multistate actions in their press
releases. See, e.g., Illinois Target Press Release, supra note 107.
286 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 37, at 856 (stating that just because public attor-
neys are not directly compensated does not mean that they don’t have a financial interest
in the action).
287 See Target Assurance of Voluntary Compliance para. 29 (May 8, 2017), https://
ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/nyag_target_settlement.pdf (“Each of the Attorneys General
agrees that the Illinois Attorney General and Connecticut Attorney General have the
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nois and Connecticut as the “lead states of the multistate investigation” and
provides that those leading states will submit the settlement amounts for each
participating state to Neiman Marcus.288  Leading AGs have the ability to
increase the overall amount of a settlement by inviting other states to partici-
pate and then allocating  a greater share of the settlement to their home
states.  This practice allows leading AGs to obtain a larger overall settlement
than if they had brought the action alone.  Broadening participation in mul-
tistate actions can increase not only the size of the pie in settlements, but also
the size of leading states’ share of the pie.  Because significant portions of
these settlements may go directly to AG offices, leading AGs may be particu-
larly tempted to “steal.”289
The allocations of several multistate settlements demonstrate this phe-
nomenon.  For example, the Target multistate investigation settled in 2017
for $18.5 million and included forty-seven states and the District of Colum-
bia.290  Illinois and Connecticut led the multistate action and received some
of the highest allocations of the settlement.  Illinois received $1.2 million of
the settlement, second only to California, which received $1.4 million, but
whose population almost triples the population of Illinois.291  Connecticut
received the fourth highest settlement amount, $1 million,292 outranking
many more populous participating states such as Florida, New York, and
Pennsylvania.293  Interestingly, the settlement did not discuss the number of
impacted consumers in each state due to Target’s data breach.  Rather, when
authority to designate such amount to be paid by TARGET to each Attorney
General . . . .”).
288 See Neiman Marcus Assurance of Voluntary Compliance para. 12 (Jan. 8, 2019),
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2019_01/AVC_Neiman_Marcus1-8-
19.pdf.
289 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 37, at 866 (discussing revolving funds to AG
offices).
290 See Illinois Target Press Release, supra note 107.
291 See id.; Abrams, supra note 89; State Population Census Estimates: 2013 Births, Deaths,
Migration Totals, supra note 273 (showing estimate of Illinois’s 2013 population to be
12,882,135 and California’s 38,332,521).
292 Illinois Target Press Release, supra note 107 (Illinois received $1.2 Million);
Abrams, supra note 89 (California received $1.4 million); L.M. Sixel, Texas to Get $1.1 Mil-
lion from Target Data Breach Settlement, HOUS. CHRON. (May 23, 2017), https://www.chron.
com/business/bizfeed/article/Texas-to-get-1-1-million-from-Target-data-breach-111
67883.php (Texas received $1.1 Million).
293 See CONN. ANN. REP., supra note 107, at 23; Malena Carollo, Target Corp. Reaches
$18.5 Million Settlement with 47 States over Data Breach, TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 23, 2017),
https://www.tampabay.com/news/business/retail/target-corp-reaches-185-million-settle-
ment-with-47-states-over-data-breach/2324885/ (reporting that Florida received $928.963);
New York Target Press Release, supra note 89 (New York received $635,000); Press Release,
Pa. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Settlement Reached with Target Following Major Consumer
Data Breach (May 23, 2017), https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/press-
releases/settlement-reached-with-target-following-major-consumer-data-breach/ (Penn-
sylvania received $469,000); State Population Census Estimates: 2013 Births, Deaths, Migration
Totals, supra note 273.
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asked about the settlement allocation, the New York AG’s office stated that
the settlement was allocated “‘largely’ based on each state’s population
size.”294  It appears that the most important factors in the amount each state
was allocated in the settlement were leadership and population, without find-
ings of how many state residents were impacted by the data breach.
TOP 5 STATES: TARGET MULTISTATE SETTLEMENT ALLOCATIONS
(LEADING STATES HIGHLIGHTED)
State Allocation 
California $1.4 million 
Illinois $1.2 million 
Texas $1.1 million 
Connecticut $1 million 
Florida $928,963 
Another example where leadership played an important role was in the
multistate settlement with the ratings agency, Standard & Poor’s (S&P).  In
2015, the federal government and a multistate group settled an action with
S&P for its ratings of toxic mortgage securities leading up to and during the
Great Recession.295  The total settlement was $1.375 billion, with $687.5 mil-
lion to be divided among nineteen states and the District of Columbia.296
The leading AGs in the action were Connecticut, Illinois, and Mississippi.297
The allocation of the settlement was determined by agreement among the
participating states.298  Leading states received some of the highest alloca-
tions of the settlement.  Illinois received the second highest settlement
amount, $52.5 million, behind California, the participating state with the
294 See Abrams, supra note 89 (quoting New York AG Eric T. Schneiderman).
295 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department and State Partners Secure
$1.375 Billion Settlement with S&P for Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up to the Finan-




297 See Press Release, Miss. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Hood Helps Lead
States to $1.375 Billion State-Federal Settlement with Standard & Poor’s (Feb. 3, 2015)
[hereinafter Mississippi S&P Press Release], https://web.archive.org/web/
20170324221755/http://www.ago.state.ms.us/releases/attorney-general-hood-helps-lead-
states-to-1-375-billion-state-federal-settlement-with-standard-poors/; Press Release, Ill. Off.
of the Att’y Gen., Madigan, DOJ & States Announce $1.375 Billion Settlement with Stan-
dard & Poor’s (Feb. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Illinois S&P Press Release], http://
www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2015_02/20150203.html (“In 2012, Madigan
was one of the first attorneys general in the country to file a lawsuit against S&P for its
misconduct that contributed to the 2008 collapse.”); Connecticut S&P Press Release, supra
note 83 (“The settlement culminates a five-year effort led by Connecticut to hold S&P
responsible for its role in the 2008 financial crisis.”)
298 See DOJ S&P Press Release, supra note 295.
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largest population.299  The third and fourth highest settlement allocations
went to Connecticut ($36 million) and Mississippi ($33 million).300  Con-
necticut and Mississippi had smaller populations than many other participat-
ing states in the multistate action.  Nevertheless, their allocations exceeded
larger population participating states such as Pennsylvania, North Carolina,
New Jersey, and Washington.301  Interestingly, many participating states
received the exact same amount of the settlement. 302  For example, both
Idaho and Pennsylvania received $21.5 million.303  There were no findings
included in the settlement that the states with larger  allocations were more
greatly impacted by S&P’s ratings than states that received smaller portions of
the settlement.  For example, there were no findings that Mississippi exper-
ienced greater harm from S&P’s ratings than other participating states.  To
the contrary, the Mississippi AG’s press release specifically referred to leader-
ship as the reason for its large settlement allocation. 304  The Connecticut
AG’s press release also alluded to the state’s leadership with respect to its
settlement allocation.305
299 See Dan Haar, S&P Agrees to $1.4B Settlement of Deception Charges that Started in Con-
necticut, HARTFORD COURANT (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.courant.com/business/hc-haar-
holder-jepsen-standard-poors-deception-20150203-column.html; Press Release, Cal. Off. of
the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces $210 Million Settlement
with Standard & Poor’s for Inflating Mortgage-Backed Securities Ratings (Feb. 3, 2015),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announces-210-
million-settlement-standard-poor (“The State of California . . . will recover $210 million in
damages.”).
300 See Mississippi S&P Press Release, supra note 297; Illinois S&P Press Release, supra
note 297.
301 See Standard & Poor’s Settlement Agreement (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.justice.
gov/file/338701/download (listing each state’s settlement amount); State Population Census
Estimates: 2013 Births, Deaths, Migration Totals, supra note 273 (listing the state populations
in 2013).
302 See DOJ S&P Press Release, supra note 295.
303 Id.
304 See Mississippi S&P Press Release, supra note 297 (“Mississippi will receive $33 mil-
lion for its role as a Lead State in the 20-state coalition.”).
305 See Connecticut S&P Press Release, supra note 83 (“Connecticut was the first state to
sue S&P in 2010 and will receive $36million in the settlement, which will go to the state’s
general fund.”).
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TOP STATES: S&P MULTISTATE SETTLEMENT ALLOCATIONS
(LEADING STATES HIGHLIGHTED)
State Allocation  
California $210 million 
Illinois $52.5 million 
Connecticut  $36 million 
Mississippi $33 million 
Delaware $25 million 
Tennesee $25 million 
In certain instances, some states have disclosed the number of affected
state residents in multistate settlements.  For example, some AG offices’ press
releases have included the number of state residents who were affected by a
data breach or faulty consumer product.  Even when harm has been quanti-
fied, leadership appears to continue to play an important role in settlement
allocation, at times an even more important role than the number of people
harmed by the misconduct.  Leading states continue to get some of the larg-
est allocations of settlements, even if they are not the states that have the
greatest numbers of affected residents.
For example, the ride-sharing company Uber was the subject of a multis-
tate action when hackers gained access to Uber drivers’ personal informa-
tion.306  Over six hundred thousand Uber drivers’ personal information was
exposed by the breach.307  Instead of notifying states of the data breach as
required by state data breach notification laws, Uber paid the hackers to keep
the breach secret.308  Ultimately, when the breach became public, Uber
became the target of a multistate action and settled with fifty states and the
District of Columbia for $148 million.309  California, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Maryland, New Jersey, and Ohio led the multistate action.310  Several other
306 See Heather Somerville, Uber to Pay $148 Million to Settle Data Breach Cover-Up with U.S.





310 See Press Release, Cal. Off. of the Att’y Gen., California Attorney General Becerra,
San Francisco District Attorney Gascón Announce $148 Million Settlement with Uber over
2016 Data Breach and Cover-Up (Sept. 26, 2018) [hereinafter California Uber Press
Release], https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/california-attorney-general-becerra-san-
francisco-district-attorney-gasc%C3%B3n; Press Release, Ill. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney
General Madigan Leads $148 Million Settlement with Uber Over 2016 Data Breach (Sept.
26, 2018) [hereinafter Illinois Uber Press Release], https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/
pressroom/2018_09/20180926b.html; Press Release, Mass. Off. of the Att’y Gen., AG Hea-
ley Leads Multistate Coalition in Reaching $148 Million Settlement with Uber over Nation-
wide Data Breach (Sept. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Massachusetts Uber Press Release], https:/
/www.mass.gov/news/ag-healey-leads-multistate-coalition-in-reaching-148-million-settle
ment-with-uber-over; Press Release, Md. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Frosh
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states such as New York, Connecticut, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Washing-
ton played a leading role by being “early movers,” instigating investigations
and actions.311  Many of the highest allocations of the settlement reflected
leadership, whether in leading the multistate group or being an “early
mover” before joining the multistate action.  For example, the top ten high-
est settlement allocations went to California, Illinois, Florida, Massachusetts,
Texas, Washington, Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, and Connecticut.312
Eight of the ten states with the highest allocations either led the multistate
action or were early movers that joined the multistate action.  In fact, AGs
referred to their leading roles in their press releases as a reason for their
states’ settlement allocations.313  The other two states in the top ten of the
Announces $148 Million Settlement with Uber over Data Breach (Sept. 26, 2018), https://
www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/press/2018/092618.pdf; Press Release, N.J. Off. of the
Att’y Gen., AG Grewal Announces Historic Settlement Resolving Uber Data Breach (Sept.
26, 2018), https://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases18/pr20180926a.html; Press Release, Ohio
Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General DeWine Announces $148 Million Multistate Settle-
ment with Uber (Sept. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Ohio Uber Press Release], https://www.ohio
attorneygeneral.gov/Media/News-Releases/September-2018/Attorney-General-DeWine-
Announces-$148-Million-Mul.
311 See New York Uber Press Release, supra note 86; Press Release, Conn. Off. of the
Att’y Gen., Connecticut Joins $148M Settlement with Uber over Delayed Data Breach
Reporting (Sept. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Connecticut Uber Press Release], https://portal.
ct.gov/AG/Press-Releases-Archived/2018-Press-Releases/Connecticut-Joins-148M-Settle
ment-with-Uber-over-Delayed-Data-Breach-Reporting; Press Release, Pa. Off. of the Att’y
Gen., Attorney General Josh Shapiro Reaches Settlement with Uber for Data Breach
Involving 13,500 Drivers in PA (Sept. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Uber Press
Release], https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/press-releases/attorney-general-
josh-shapiro-reaches-settlement-with-uber-for-data-breach-involving-13500-drivers-in-pa/;
Press Release, Wash. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., AG Ferguson: Uber to Pay $2.2 Million to
Washington Drivers over 2016 Data Breach (Sept. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Washington Uber
Press Release], https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-uber-pay-22-mil-
lion-washington-drivers-over-2016-data-breach; see also Hamza Shaban, Uber Is Sued over Mas-
sive Data Breach After Paying Hackers to Keep Quiet, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/11/24/uber-is-sued-over-massive-data-
breach-after-paying-hackers-to-keep-quiet/.
312 See Nick Lucchesi, Uber’s $148M Settlement: The Legal Reason Many Drivers Won’t See a
Dime, INVERSE (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.inverse.com/article/49355-uber-s-148-million-
settlement-reveals-how-states-choose-not-to-pay-drivers (listing each state’s settlement
amount); California Uber Press Release, supra note 310; Illinois Uber Press Release, supra
note 310; Massachusetts Uber Press Release, supra note 310; Press Release, Tex. Off. of the
Att’y Gen., AG Paxton Reaches $148 Million Settlement with Uber for Data Breach (Sept.
26, 2018), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-reaches-148-
million-settlement-uber-data-breach; Washington Uber Press Release, supra note 311;
Pennsylvania Uber Press Release, supra note 311; Ohio Uber Press Release, supra note 310;
New York Uber Press Release, supra note 86; Connecticut Uber Press Release, supra note
311; Florida to Get $8.2M of $148M Uber Data Breach Settlement, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 26,
2018), https://apnews.com/ae3050ebaf234db49b78335d1eb09e92.
313 See, e.g., Ohio Uber Press Release, supra note 310 (“As a co-lead state in the multis-
tate investigation that led to the settlement, Ohio will receive $5,585,868 of the total settle-
ment.”); Washington Uber Press Release, supra note 311 (“Washington received a larger
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settlement allocations were Florida and Texas, high population states.  Many
participating states provided compensation from the settlement to Uber driv-
ers, most commonly $100 per driver.314
TOP 10 STATES: UBER SETTLEMENT ALLOCATIONS
(LEADING OR “EARLY MOVER” STATES HIGHLIGHTED)
State Allocation 
California $26 million 
Illinois $8.5 million 
Florida $8.2 million 
Massachusetts $7.1 million 
Texas $6.4 million 
Washington $5.8 million 
Pennsylvania $5.7 million 
Ohio $5.6 million 
New York $5.1 million 
Connecticut $4.5 million 
In office press releases, a handful of AGs who participated in the Uber
settlement provided an approximate number of drivers who were affected by
the breach.  These disclosures support the assertion that leadership in the
multistate action was an important factor in settlement allocation, notwith-
standing the number of affected state residents.  For example, both Ohio and
Colorado disclosed the same number of affected Uber drivers—12,000 driv-
ers in each state.315  Ohio was a leading state, but Colorado was not.316  Ohio
received $5.5 million and Colorado received $2.1 million of the multistate
settlement.317  This means that Ohio received more than twice as much as
Colorado in the settlement, even though they had the same number of
affected drivers.
The importance of leadership holds true, even when there were more
affected Uber drivers in other states.  Take again the example of Ohio, a
share of the nationwide $148 million settlement because Ferguson sued Uber in November
of 2017 . . . .  Washington was one of just a small number of states that sued Uber over its
conduct related to the data breach prior to the multistate resolution.”).
314 See Lucchesi, supra note 312 (listing seventeen states that are providing compensa-
tion to Uber drivers).
315 See Ohio Uber Press Release, supra note 310; Press Release, Colo. Off. of the Att’y
Gen., Attorney General Cynthia H. Coffman Announces $148 Million Multi-State Settle-
ment with Uber over Data Breach (Sept. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Colorado Uber Press
Release], https://stopfraudcolorado.gov/about-consumer-protection/press-releases/2018-
09-26-000000/ag-coffman-uber-data-breach.html.
316 See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
317 See Ohio Uber Press Release, supra note 310; Colorado Uber Press Release, supra
note 315.
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leading state in the Uber settlement that received $5.5 million and had
12,000 affected Uber drivers.  In comparison, North Carolina had about
15,600 affected drivers and received nearly $3.7 million, and Virginia had
19,335 affected drivers and received $2.9 million.318  This means that Vir-
ginia received about half as much as Ohio in the settlement, even though
Virginia had about forty percent more affected drivers.
The Neiman Marcus multistate settlement is another example of where
leadership played an important role in the settlement, even when a greater
number of people were affected in other participating states.  Neiman Mar-
cus experienced a data breach in 2014 where 370,000 cardholders’ informa-
tion was compromised, with 9200 cards used fraudulently as a result of the
breach.319  Illinois and Connecticut led the multistate action.320  The total
settlement amount was $1.5 million, and forty-three states and the District of
Columbia participated in the settlement.321  The highest settlement alloca-
tions went to Illinois and Connecticut, with Illinois receiving $124,000 and
Connecticut receiving $102,000.322  Indeed, Connecticut referred to its lead-
ership role in conjunction with its settlement allocation.323  The states
receiving the next three highest settlement amounts were Texas ($95,000),
New York ($58,000), and New Jersey ($57,000).324  About half of participat-
318 See Lauren Ohnesorge, Nearly 16,000 NC Uber Drivers Can Get a Piece of the $148M
Settlement, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/news/
2018/09/26/nearly-16-000-nc-uber-drivers-can-get-a-piece-of.html; Press Release, Va. Off.
of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Herring Reaches $148 Million Settlement with Uber
over Data Breach (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.oag.state.va.us/media-center/news-
releases/1276-september-26-2018-herring-reaches-148-million-settlement-with-uber-over-
data-breach.
319 See Press Release, Ill. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Madigan Announces
$1.5 Million Settlement with Neiman Marcus (Jan. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Illinois Neiman
Press Release], http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2019_01/20190108.
html.
320 See id.  Maryland AG’s Office stated that Maryland sat on the executive committee
but was not listed in the settlement as a lead state.  The settlement allocation for Maryland
has not been made publicly available. See Neiman Marcus Assurance of Voluntary Compli-
ance, supra note 288; Press Release, Md. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Frosh
Announces Settlement with Neiman Marcus over 2013 Data Breach (Jan. 8, 2019), http://
www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/press/2019/010819.pdf.
321 See Illinois Neiman Press Release, supra note 319.
322 See id.; 2018–2019 CONN. ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 28 [hereinafter Conn. AG Annual
Report].
323 See Conn. AG Annual Report, supra note 322, at 28. (“The Department served in a R
leadership role in the investigation, and received $102,144.91 as part of the settlement.”).
324 See Press Release, Tex. Off. of the Att’y Gen., AG Paxton Announces $1.5 Million
Settlement with Neiman Marcus over Data Breach (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.texasattor
neygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-announces-15-million-settlement-neiman-mar-
cus-over-data-breach; Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General
James Announces $1.5M Settlement with Retailer Neiman Marcus over Data Breach (Jan.
8, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-announces-15m-
settlement-retailer-neiman-marcus-over-data; Press Release, N.J. Off. of the Att’y Gen., AG
Grewal: Neiman Marcus Agrees to Improve Cybersecurity, Pay $1.5 Million Penalty After
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ing AGs disclosed the number of affected cardholders in their press releases.
Again, leadership appears to play a stronger role in settlement allocation
than the number of affected people in each state.  Even though Connecticut
had 3000 affected card holders, it received a significantly higher settlement,
$102,000, than states with much higher numbers of affected card holders,
such as Texas with 65,644 cardholders ($95,000), New York with 27,600 card-
holders ($58,000), and New Jersey with 17,000 cardholders ($57,000).325






New York $58,000 
New Jersey $57,000 
Stealing is a problem because it allows leading states to allocate more
money to their own states at the expense of other participating states, even
when more harm may be experienced in other states.  Stealing also can lead
to underdeterrence of corporate misconduct.  If leadership is a deciding fac-
tor in settlement allocations, the settlement may not properly account for the
harm created by corporate misconduct, particularly if the amount of harm is
a less important factor, or not ascertained at all, in participating states.  This
leads to underdeterrence because corporations can settle for less than the
harm they have inflicted.  Corporations that enter into multistate settlements
can still get the benefit of settling with every state at the same time at a lower
cost than if the corporation had to settle with each state individually for the
amount of harm created.  Like class counsel in private class actions, leading
AGs can strike “sweetheart settlements” where leading AGs allocate the larg-
est portions of the settlement to themselves, to the detriment of participating
states and their residents.  Similarly, class action “sweetheart settlements”
underdeter future misconduct by paying off class counsel to agree to settle-
ments that do not reflect the harm created by misconduct, while also provid-
ing the corporation the benefit of settling with a large number of states at the
same time.  As public enforcement settlements are increasingly including
public compensation, both compensation and deterrence are important to
consider when multistate settlements are allocated.  Stealing threatens to
undermine both goals of enforcement.
It could be argued that leading states deserve a greater amount of the
settlement because they have invested resources in leading the multistate
Breach of Payment Card Data (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases19/
pr20190108a.html.
325 See supra notes 319–24.
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action.  Other participating states have been able to, in essence, “free ride”
on leading AGs’ investment of resources in the action.326  If leading states do
not have the incentive of a greater portion of the settlement, they might not
bring action at all, to the detriment of all participating states.  However, AGs
may be incentivized to lead without stealing.
Leading AGs are often from populous states that may be able to demon-
strate the greatest injury and therefore still receive the largest allocations of
the settlements.  It may also be possible to incentivize AGs through providing
attorneys’ fees as part of settlements.327  Attorneys’ fees could more accu-
rately reflect the amount of investment in the action as opposed to providing
the state a larger portion of the settlement.  Attorneys’ fees could also have
the benefit of going directly to the AGs office as opposed to the state treasury
and could further motivate AGs to lead multistate actions.  Furthermore,
leading AGs may also receive reputational benefits from leading, even if their
states do not receive the largest allocations of the settlement.  For example,
leading AGs may be able to shape corporate reforms and other injunctive
relief that they could tout while campaigning for reelection.
In light of stealing, AGs in participating states need to weigh whether
their states and their residents are better off “opting out” of multistate action
by pursuing action alone.  In class actions, class members with high value
claims are likely to get a larger recovery by pursuing the action alone, than if
their claims are “diluted” by other class members with lower value claims.
Similarly, individual states can “opt out” of multistate action and potentially
receive a better settlement than the allocation they would have received in
the multistate settlement.
For example, there was a multistate action against General Motors (GM)
based on GM’s failure to disclosure its faulty ignition switches.328  Every state
and the District of Columbia participated in the multistate settlement, with
the exception of Arizona.329  The total multistate settlement was $120 mil-
lion, and the action was led by a Multistate Executive Committee comprised
of Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Penn-
326 See Dishman, supra note 35, at 429.
327 Some multistate actions provided attorneys’ fees to leading states including the
National Mortgage Settlement and the PHH Settlement. See National Mortgage Settlement
Summary, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 4, 2013), https://www.ncsl.org/
research/financial-services-and-commerce/national-mortgage-settlement-summary.aspx
(Executive Committee received $10M); Consent Judgment at para. 7, Alabama v. PHH
Mortg. Corp., No. 1:18-cv-00009 (filed in D.D.C. May 10, 2018) (investigating AGs received
$5 million).
328 See Press Release, Tex. Off. of the Att’y Gen., AG Paxton Reaches $120 Million Set-
tlement with General Motors Company over Defective Ignition Switch (Oct. 19, 2017)
[hereinafter Texas GM Press Release], https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/
releases/ag-paxton-reaches-120-million-settlement-general-motors-company-over-defective-
ignition-switch.
329 See id.; Agreed Final Consent Judgment at 1, State v. Gen. Motors, No. D-1-GN-17-
005853 (filed in Tex. Dist. Ct. Oct. 19, 2017) (not including Arizona as a signatory).
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sylvania, South Carolina, and Texas.330  Under the settlement, the Multistate
Executive Committee was responsible to communicate each state’s settle-
ment allocation to GM and such amounts were “in the sole discretion” of the
Executive Committee.331  Of the top ten settlement allocations among the
states, eight state AGs were on the Multistate Executive Committee, including
Texas, Ohio, Florida, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey,
and Connecticut.332
Arizona had participated in the multistate investigation, but decided to
“opt out” of the multistate settlement and instead settle separately with
GM.333  Arizona settled with GM for a maximum of $7.28 million, with $6.28
million set aside for affected Arizona consumers and an additional $1 million
for the state.334  The Arizona AG claimed that if Arizona had participated in
the multistate settlement, Arizona’s allocation would have been approxi-
mately $2 million, which is less than thirty percent of the total amount of
GM’s separate settlement with Arizona.335  The Arizona settlement also pro-
vided consumer compensation of at least $200 per affected consumer.336  In
contrast, the multistate settlement did not provide consumer compensa-
tion.337  Arizona was able to negotiate separately one of the highest amounts
330 Agreed Final Consent Judgment paras. 1.2, 14, supra note 329.
331 See id. para. 7.1.
332 See Texas GM Press Release, supra note 328 (allocation of $7.3 million); 2017 OHIO
ATT’Y GEN. CONSUMER PROT. ANN. REP. 8 (allocation of $6.2 million); Press Release, Fla.
Off. of the Att’y Gen., $120 Million Settlement Reached with General Motors for Defective
Ignition Switch (Oct. 19, 2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20171023091118/http://
www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/
00A5F10BEC4453F2852581BE0057B9B3 (allocation of $6 million); Press Release, S.C. Off.
of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Alan Wilson Reaches $120 Million Settlement with GM
over Defective Ignition Switches, (Oct. 20, 2017) http://www.scag.gov/archives/33636
(allocation $5 million); Press Release, Pa. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Josh
Shapiro Reaches Settlement with General Motors over Defective Ignition Switches (Oct.
19, 2017), https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/press-releases/attorney-gen-
eral-josh-shapiro-reaches-settlement-with-general-motors-over-defective-ignition-switches/
(allocation of $4.7 million); Press Release, Mich. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Schuette: Michigan
to Receive More than $4 Million from General Motors over Faulty Ignition Switches (Oct.
19, 2017) [hereinafter Michigan GM Press Release], https://www.michigan.gov/ag/
0,4534,7-359—450199—,00.html (allocation of $4.2 million); Press Release, N.J. Off. of the
Att’y Gen., Attorney General Porrino: New Jersey to Receive $4.1 Million from Multi-State
Settlement with GM over Deadly Defect (Oct. 19, 2017), https://nj.gov/oag/new-
sreleases17/pr20171019a.html (allocation of $4.1 million); Press Release, Conn. Off. of
Att’y Gen., Conn. Joins $120 Million Settlement with General Motors over Defective Igni-
tion Switch (Oct. 19, 2017) https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Press-Releases-Archived/2017-Press-
Releases/Conn-Joins-$120M-Settlement-with—General-Motors-over-Defective-Ignition-
Switch (allocation $3.2 million).
333 See Arizona GM Press Release, supra note 72.
334 See Consent Decree at 7, 9, Arizona ex rel. Brnovich v. Gen. Motors, No. CV2014-
014090 (filed in Ariz. Sup. Ct. Mar. 6, 2018).
335 Arizona GM Press Release, supra note 72.
336 Id.
337 Agreed Final Consent Judgment at 14, supra note 329.
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that states participating in the multistate settlement received, even though
Arizona had considerably fewer affected consumers than other states partici-
pating in the multistate action.  For example, Arizona had 33,000 affected
consumers and negotiated $7.28 million, whereas Michigan had 600,000
affected consumers and received $4.29 million under the multistate
settlement.338
Other states have opted out of multistate settlements and pursued action
alone.  For example, Oklahoma was the only state that did not participate in
the National Mortgage Settlement.  The National Mortgage Settlement arose
from mortgage abuses leading up to and during the Great Recession.  It
included the five largest U.S. mortgage servicers and settled for a total of $29
billion.339  Oklahoma was the only state to settle separately.  Oklahoma
claimed that it received additional settlement benefits by settling separately,
such as its residents being paid first, that other states did not receive in the
multistate settlement.340
The question of whether to participate in multistate settlement or opt
out and pursue action alone is a critical question for states pursuing recov-
eries from the opioid epidemic.341  In light of its devastating effects, the
amount of a state’s settlement could have a large impact on the state and its
affected residents.  A multistate group has been investigating several
pharmaceuticals companies, but certain states have decided to pursue action
alone.  For example, Oklahoma pursued Purdue Pharmaceutical in a sepa-
338 Arizona GM Press Release, supra note 72; Michigan GM Press Release, supra note
332.
339 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
340 Oklahoma was the only state not to join the settlement, choosing to settle separately
with the five servicers for $18.6 million.  Okla. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Oklahoma Mortgage
Settlement Fact Sheet, OKLA. DIGITAL PRAIRIE (Feb. 9, 2012), https://digitalprairie.ok.gov/
digital/collection/stgovpub/id/136442/rec/2.  Oklahoma claims it did not join the fed-
eral settlement because the federal settlement
implement[ed] housing policy through mortgage reduction for homeowners
unharmed by deceptive banking practices, and simply not paying their mort-
gages. . . .  The federal government added these features to regulate the industry
through litigation instead of legislation. . . .  [T]he added features are outside the
scope of authority of attorneys general.
Id.  The Oklahoma AG claims that the separate settlement “will provide greater compensa-
tion at a faster pace than the federal agreement.” Id.; see also Letter from Att’ys Gen. E.
Scott Pruitt, Jon Bruning, and Luther Strange to Att’y Gen. Tom Miller (Mar. 16, 2011)
(on file with author) (stating concerns that the term sheet for the national mortgage settle-
ment “has morphed into an attempt to establish an overarching regulatory scheme that
fundamentally restructures the mortgage loan industry in the United States”); Steve Olaf-
son, Oklahoma Mortgage Fraud Victims Receive First Settlement Checks, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2012),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-oklahoma-mortgage-compensation/oklahoma-
mortgage-fraud-victims-receive-first-settlement-checks-idUSBRE89F01Q20121016.
341 See Lawson, supra note 257 (commenting that it is “rare” for so many states, includ-
ing states with leadership roles, to have pulled out of the multistate opioid action in favor
of pursuing their own actions).
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rate action and was the first to settle with Purdue for $270 million.342  Several
other states have opted to bring action independently against pharmaceutical
companies that produce opioids.343
Stealing is a phenomenon that thrives with little oversight.  It encour-
ages settlements that are not based on the harm that has occurred in each
state.  In prioritizing leadership, states may neglect to even inquire into the
amount of harm that has resulted from corporate misconduct.  This not only
results in undercompensating affected state residents, but also underdeter-
ring future corporate misconduct.  Stealing in multistate settlements means
that AGs should consider whether opting out may be in the best interest of
their states.
IV. INCREASED MONITORING IN MULTISTATE ACTIONS
Agency costs persist when there is a lack of monitoring, and class action
squared agency problems are no exception.  Reducing class action squared
problems, like borrowing and stealing, requires that AGs’ clients have greater
ability to monitor their behavior in multistate actions.  An AG’s clients are
the state residents and the state as a political entity.344  Increasing the ability
of state residents and the state clients to monitor their AGs reduces agency
costs like borrowing and stealing.  Increased monitoring can come through
increased transparency for voters, legislative oversight, and judicial scrutiny.
To be sure, increased oversight in any particular area is not a comprehensive
“fix” for agency problems in multistate actions.  Rather, considering a combi-
nation of reforms to increase accountability through democratic, legislative,
and judicial means offers alternatives for reducing agency problems in multi-
state actions.
A. Increased Voter Monitoring
Increased voter monitoring is a means of reducing class action squared
problems.  Voter monitoring of AG behavior in parens patriae actions is
problematic, but it is made even more difficult in the context of multistate
actions.345  For example, voters lack the ability to effectively monitor stealing
in multistate actions.  Because of the lack of voter monitoring, participating
342 See Lenny Bernstein & Katie Zezima, Purdue Pharma, State of Oklahoma Reach Settle-
ment in Landmark Opioid Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.washington
post.com/national/health-science/purdue-pharma-state-of-oklahoma-reach-settlement-in-
landmark-opioid-lawsuit/2019/03/26/69aa5cda-4f11-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html.
343 See Complaint at para. 1, Alabama v. Purdue Pharma, Inc., No. 1:18-op-45236 (filed
in M.D. Ala. Feb. 6, 2018); Tina Bellon, U.S. State Lawsuits Against Purdue Pharma over Opioid
Epidemic Mount, REUTERS (May 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-
litigation/u-s-state-lawsuits-against-purdue-pharma-over-opioid-epidemic-mount-idUSKCN1
IG2WU.
344 See Marshall, supra note 29, at 2454, 2462–63. R
345 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 514–15 (discussing how AG elections
are not an effective means of client monitoring).
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AGs are not held accountable for settlement allocations, and they do not
have to monitor leading AGs’ behavior.
One reason it is difficult for voters to monitor stealing in multistate
actions is that the data about settlement allocations are not easily accessible
to the public.  Multistate settlement documents most often do not disclose
the breakdown among all participating states.  In order to find out how the
settlement is allocated, it is often necessary to consult each state’s press
release, court filings, or even contact the AG’s office.  Often press release
headlines include the amount of the global settlement, but the state’s alloca-
tion of the settlement is buried in the body of press release, if that informa-
tion is provided at all.  For voters to be informed about stealing, they would
need to compile the settlement amounts for each participating state and
compare them to see how their AG performed vis-à-vis other states.  Needless
to say, this is a time-consuming process that few, if any, voters, would under-
take.346  This makes it difficult for voters to be well-informed about the settle-
ments their AGs enter into, and it also makes it difficult for political
challengers to call into question the AG’s enforcement history.347  The AG
offices that provide their state voters the most information about settlement
allocations are likely to be leading or high population states that are already
receiving the highest allocations of the settlement.348
The difficulty for voters to monitor settlements may make AGs indiffer-
ent to stealing in multistate actions.  AGs that participate in multistate
actions, but do not lead them, get the benefit of getting a portion of the
settlement with little investment of their office’s resources.  These AGs can
leverage reputational gains in settlements by publicizing the larger global set-
tlement amount and then not disclosing the amount that the state actually
received or how the settlement allocation compares with other states’ alloca-
tions.  Because participating AGs know it is difficult for their voters to moni-
tor and they are receiving reputational gains at little cost to their offices, AGs
may not object to leading states stealing.
Voters would have a greater ability to monitor their AGs’ behavior in
multistate actions if there were greater transparency about settlements.  The
democratic process is an important channel to monitor AGs because most of
them are democratically elected.349  AGs are often sensitive to voter opinion
because many AGs seek reelection or election to a “higher office.”350  Even
though voting is not a good substitute for client monitoring in individual
parens patriae actions, voters can monitor overall AG enforcement records
through elections.  Performance in a series of high-profile multistate actions
346 Just ask my research assistant who spent many hours visiting every AG’s website to
collect information about settlement allocations.  Thanks again to Brandon Bourg.
347 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 37, at 875–76.
348 For example, some AGs will provide information in the press release if their state
received the highest allocation of the settlement. See, e.g., New York Target Press Release,
supra note 89; California Target Press Release, supra note 89.
349 Provost, Aspiring Governor, supra note 40, at 599.
350 Id. at 597.
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creates an enforcement record for which voters are positioned to hold AGs
accountable.  Increasing transparency about multistate settlements would
allow voters to be better informed about their AG’s enforcement record.
If voters were informed about their AG’s settlement track record, they
could better exercise their votes to monitor their AG’s behavior in multistate
actions.  If voters are satisfied with the settlements their AGs are negotiating
in multistate actions, they can vote to reelect the AG.  But if voters think that
their AG is underperforming, perhaps due to class action squared problems,
they can vote for another candidate.  If AGs know that settlement informa-
tion will be easily accessible to voters, they may be more likely to object to
borrowing and stealing.  Furthermore, future political opponents would have
access to the information and could give voters more meaningful choices
about the direction of future state enforcement.
Increasing transparency in multistate settlements could be relatively sim-
ple.  Multistate settlements could include a breakdown of the settlement allo-
cations for each state as an appendix to the settlement.  Settlements are
generally made public, but only a few multistate settlements include a state-
by-state breakdown.  For example, both the National Mortgage Settlement
and Wells Fargo multistate settlements provided an appendix with the settle-
ment breakdowns by state.351  Including a breakdown in the settlement docu-
ment would be a low-cost and simple means of providing the information to
the public.  AGs typically include a copy of the settlement with their press
releases on their websites, and this information could easily be disseminated
under current practices.  If the information was consolidated and publicly
available, voters would then have a source of information about each multis-
tate settlement to judge the performance of their AG.
More specifically, increasing the transparency of settlement information
would reduce the class action squared problems of borrowing and stealing.
For example, in the case of borrowing, if states with strong consumer protec-
tion or data privacy laws were routinely receiving small portions of the settle-
ment, and voters were aware of the low settlement amounts, AGs may more
strenuously object to settlement allocations based on state population.
Rather, AGs may insist that the strength of their laws be taken into considera-
tion when allocating the settlement.  AGs may also consider opting out if they
have particularly strong causes of action because of the strength of their state
laws.  AGs may change their behavior about borrowing if their state voters
have more information about how the settlement is allocated in relation to
the strength of their state laws.
Increased settlement transparency will also decrease stealing because
voters would have the ability to better monitor their AGs.  AGs may much
more closely police stealing if they represent a state where the harm is high,
but the settlement is low because their voters will be able to make compari-
351 See, e.g., Consent Judgment at B-1, supra note 95.  Wells Fargo Settlement Agree-
ment at A1–A3, Pa. Off. of the Att’y Gen., (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.attorneygeneral.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Wells-Fargo-Multistate-Settlement-Agreement-12-28-
18.pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-1\NDL106.txt unknown Seq: 54  5-NOV-20 8:41
344 notre dame law review [vol. 96:1
sons between the states.  AGs may be more likely to challenge allocations
based on leadership and instead insist that greater attention be focused on
the harm that occurred in each state.  If states are compensated to a greater
degree based on harm, it may be that leadership in multistate actions shifts to
states that are the most harmed as opposed to states that have the most
resources to expend on leadership.  A shift in leadership may mean that cor-
porations will have to pay higher settlements if the leading states are also the
most harmed because they may have greater incentive to demand higher set-
tlements.  A greater attention to harm in each state would also likely more
optimally deter future corporate misconduct.  If corporations were forced to
pay settlements based on harm experienced in each state, then corporations
would better internalize the cost of fraud and be better deterred in the
future.
Increased voter monitoring may not be by itself enough to hold AGs
accountable in multistate actions.  The problem with voter oversight is that
voters will not have the opportunity to monitor settlements on an individual
basis, but only periodically during an election cycle on an AG’s collective
enforcement record.352  That being said, increased transparency still allows
voters some ability to incrementally monitor their AGs between elections.  If
voters have better information about multistate settlements, they can contact
their AGs’ offices and voice their opinions.  Even if voters’ opinions could
not undo a settlement that was already finalized, AGs could adjust their
behavior in the future based on voter feedback.  For example, AGs could opt
out of future multistate actions or demand a greater portion of a multistate
settlement.  AGs would be able to get an indication prior to elections of vot-
ers’ reactions to their participation in multistate actions.
AGs could also consider providing opportunities for notice and com-
ment on multistate settlements.  For example, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion is required to put its proposed settlements up for notice and comment
for a particular amount of time and allow the public to comment on the
settlement before the settlement is finalized.353  In multistate actions, each
AG could put a proposed settlement on his or her website, including the
amounts of settlement for each state.  Notice and comment procedures
would give voters greater opportunity to monitor their AGs on an individual
settlement basis.  It may also inform an AG’s decision as to whether to opt out
of the multistate settlement.
AGs may be more likely to opt out of multistate actions if their voters
have the ability to exercise more oversight.  On more high-profile multistate
actions, it is more likely that AGs will opt out of multistate action when they
have pressure from voters.  When the public is monitoring AG behavior more
closely, AGs may consider opting out more frequently because the public
cares more deeply about settlements in high-profile incidents.  Increased
transparency about settlements in multistate actions allows voters to hold
352 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 521.
353 See Federal Register Notices, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/federal-register-notices
(last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
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their AGs more accountable and, thus, reduce agency costs in multistate
settlements.
B. Increased Legislative Oversight
Increased legislative oversight would also reduce class action squared
problems.  In addition to state residents, the AG’s client is also the state.354
Certain state officials and state entities are empowered to act on behalf of the
state, including the AG.  However, allowing the AG to have the dual role of
“speaking for the state” as the principal and representing the state as the
agent creates an environment for agency costs to arise.  Similarly, in the con-
text of class actions, class counsel has a dual role, simultaneously being the
agent representing the class and also being the largest stakeholder in the
class, due to her interest in her attorneys’ fees.355
In order to remedy this problem, the state legislature can step in to act
as the “state client” in monitoring AG behavior in multistate actions through
its legislative oversight capabilities.  Increasing legislative oversight would bet-
ter ensure that the state’s interests were being served in multistate actions.
Furthermore, since state legislators are also elected, legislative oversight pro-
vides another avenue of democratic accountability.
State legislatures are in a good position to consider the interests of the
state.  Legislatures have powers to make state law and allocate state budgets.
Legislatures also have committees that are structured to provide oversight
functions.  In many instances, the AG may already be accustomed to appear-
ing before legislative committees to report on issues or lobby the legislature
for more funds.  While individual voters may not have the time or resources
to dig deeply into an AG’s enforcement record, the legislature has institu-
tional capacity to consider the AG’s performance in enforcement actions.
Legislatures may also have a deeper understanding of state laws and the pol-
icy trade-offs involved in the making of state law.
Legislatures also have a greater incentive to monitor on behalf of the
state than individual voters since the state is a larger recipient of settlement
funds than any individual voter.  Most settlement funds are directed to the
state in one form or another, whether it be to the state treasury or specific
state enforcement efforts, or to advance policy objectives.356  Because state
legislatures allocate the state budget and consider state revenue, the legisla-
ture may be most motivated to consider the interests of the state in multistate
settlements.
There are simple means to have meaningful legislative oversight of AGs
in multistate settlements.  AGs may file periodic reports that include informa-
tion about enforcement settlements and state allocations of the settlement.
AGs may also be required to testify before committees about their enforce-
ment record as it relates to multistate actions.  Legislatures may also consider
354 See About NAAG, supra note 33.
355 See Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note 125, at 230–31.
356 See, e.g., National Mortgage Settlement Summary, supra note 327.
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passing legislation to allow AGs to keep a portion of settlements as part of
their office budgets to incentivize AGs to maximize the amount they seek for
the state.357
Increasing legislative oversight would reduce class action squared
problems.  To the extent that the legislature thinks that the AG is “borrow-
ing” and sidestepping state law, the legislature would have the opportunity to
comment on the AG’s actions.  AGs would also have the opportunity to speak
directly to the legislature about strengthening particular state laws based on
the AG’s experience in multistate actions.  Legislatures could also monitor
the amount of settlements provided to the state and direct how the settle-
ments are expended by the state.  By providing more oversight of settlements
and how the funds are directed, AGs may be less likely to be complicit about
stealing, knowing that the legislatures will be asking questions about the set-
tlement amounts.
Legislatures may also pass resolutions calling upon AGs to opt out of
multistate action as a means to manage class action squared problems.  For
example, in the context of the multistate investigation concerning the opioid
epidemic, the Utah State Legislature passed a resolution calling on the AG to
bring action alone, despite the fact that the Utah AG was already participat-
ing in the multistate investigation.358  Specifically, the Utah legislature
passed a resolution calling upon the AG to “immediately and publicly com-
mit to directly filing suit against prescription opioid manufacturers, instead of
joining a suit with other plaintiffs, in order to seek the maximum award for
damages from prescription opioid manufacturers for the citizens of the
state.”359  Implicit in this resolution was the legislature’s assumption that
their state residents would receive greater “damages” if Utah acted alone,
instead of with other states.  This may be because it would prevent “stealing”
by leading states in a multistate action.  Ultimately the Utah AG acquiesced to
the state legislature and brought action alone against Purdue Pharmaceuti-
cal.360  Legislatures can put significant pressure on AGs to monitor their
behavior in multistate actions to reduce agency costs.
That being said, problems may arise when there is increased legislative
involvement in an AG’s enforcement agenda.  Legislatures might infringe on
enforcement discretion.  AGs traditionally have had considerable discretion
in enforcement.  This discretion is important in allowing AGs to make trade-
offs about how to deploy enforcement resources and advance the state’s pol-
icy objectives.  It also may increase the polarization of enforcement decisions
if the majority of the legislature is a different political party than the AG.
357 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 37, at 856.
358 Ben Winslow, Utah’s Attorney General Says a Lawsuit over Opioids Is Drafted, But He’s Not
Filing It Yet, FOX 13 SALT LAKE CITY (Mar. 23, 2018), https://fox13now.com/2018/03/23/
utahs-attorney-general-says-a-lawsuit-over-opioids-is-drafted-but-hes-not-filing-it-yet/.
359 H.J.R. Res. 12, 2018 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2018) (emphasis added).
360 See Utah Announces Major Lawsuit Against Opioid Manufacturer Purdue Pharma, UTAH
OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., https://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/utah-announces-lawsuit-against-
purdue-pharma/ (Jan. 18, 2020).
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The legislature could deprive the AG of resources or pass laws restricting the
AG’s powers based on positions that AGs took in enforcement actions.  For
example, state legislatures have flexed their muscles with both their legisla-
tive power and power of the purse to “rein in” AGs who have taken positions
in litigation contrary to the views of the state legislature.361  Furthermore,
many state legislatures only meet for a small part of the year and cannot
monitor the AG on a settlement-by-settlement basis.  This means that the
AG’s discretion would be preserved, but it also means that the legislature may
not be able to weigh in on a particular settlement until it is too late.  These
limitations make it likely that other forms of monitoring will need to work in
conjunction with legislative oversight to address class action squared
problems.
C. Increased Judicial Scrutiny
Increased judicial scrutiny is another avenue of reducing class action
squared problems.  There is currently little, if any, judicial oversight of multi-
state settlements.  Multistate settlements often do not require any judicial
approval.362  When settlements are filed with the court, they are generally
perfunctorily approved.363  Judicial hesitancy to scrutinize multistate settle-
ments may be due to the court’s deference to the judgment of an elected
representative and assumption that the democratic process will act as a check
on inadequate settlements.364  But as described above, this assumption about
voters’ ability to act as a check on adequate settlements may be faulty due to
the lack of transparency in settlements.  The lack of judicial scrutiny is in
contrast to class action settlements that require court approval, and where it
is assumed that class members lack the ability to monitor class counsel.  But if
voters do not have the information to act as a check on inadequate settle-
ments, then the judiciary may need to take a stronger role in approving mul-
tistate settlements.
Unlike voter or legislative oversight, judicial oversight can monitor set-
tlements on a settlement-by-settlement basis.  Courts are institutionally exper-
ienced in considering and approving settlements and have expertise in
361 See Molly Beck & Patrick Marley, Republican-Controlled Wisconsin Legislature Clears
Measures Weakening Incoming Democratic Governor, Attorney General, USA TODAY (Dec. 5,
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/12/05/wisconsin-gop-scale-
back-democratic-power/2212625002/; Jonathan Oosting & Beth LeBlanc, GOP Moves to
Dilute Power of Governor, AG, Secretary of State, DETROIT NEWS (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/11/29/bill-would-allow-
legislators-intercede-any-court-case-involving-state/2150818002/.  Legislatures have also
expanded AGs’ powers to allow them to circumvent the governor to bring litigation on
behalf of the state. See Associated Press, Maryland Lawmakers Expand Attorney General’s Pow-
ers, Cite Trump Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mary-
land-lawmakers-expand-attorney-generals-powers-cite-trump-concerns-1487214202.
362 See Cox, supra note 14, 2355.
363 See id.
364 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 510.
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analyzing legal actions and the trade-offs made in litigation and settlement.
For example, judicial scrutiny has been used to address agency costs in the
context of class actions.  Courts have applied scrutiny at class certification
and settlement approval to align the interests of class counsel with the
class.365  This judicial oversight holds counsel accountable to the court for
the settlements that they negotiate on behalf of the class.
While procedures exist for judicial scrutiny in class actions, similar pro-
cedures do not exist in the context of AG actions.  Courts do not vet AGs for
adequate representation and only in some contexts are AG settlements sub-
ject to court approval.  Courts could use the same procedural mechanisms in
Rule 23 to increase judicial monitoring in AG actions, and in particular mul-
tistate actions.366  But the concept of adequate representation is illusive, par-
ticularly in the context of public representation.  Even in the class action
context, where courts have long been required to consider the adequacy of
representation, the concept is undertheorized, and class action scholars disa-
gree over what it means and how best to achieve it.367
It is even more difficult to make assessments about the adequacy of an
elected AG.  For example, courts could scrutinize the adequacy of an AG’s
representation at the outset of an action, including making a searching
review of her experience, knowledge, and office resources.368  Courts, how-
ever, are hesitant to question the adequacy of public representation, instead
preferring to assume adequate representation in the public context.369  This
assumption protects courts from the awkward position of potentially declar-
ing the AG inadequate when she has been elected by the people, especially
since the court is not empowered to appoint another lawyer to take the AG’s
stead.
In the context of multistate actions, courts could evaluate whether an
AG leading a multistate action “fairly and adequately” represented the class
365 See supra subsection I.B.1.
366 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 546 (noting judicial inquiry into the
adequacy of representation “is to ensure the attorney general’s ‘loyalty’ to the members of
the parens patriae group”).
367 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 543 (“The concept of adequate rep-
resentation is undertheorized even in the class action context, and class action scholars
disagree over just what adequate representation means and how best to secure it.”); David
Marcus, Making Adequacy More Adequate, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 137, 138 (2009) (“Given
its importance, it is remarkable that the adequacy concept has little doctrinal or theoretical
coherence.”); Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137,
1137–38 (2009) (“Despite the allure of the principle, we have very little sense of what
adequate representation means, how we can measure it, or how we can guarantee it.”).
368 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 542–43 (“Rather than assuming that
public representation is always constitutionally adequate, courts could undertake a mean-
ingful inquiry into whether the attorney general has both the resources and the incentives
to pursue the relevant claims vigorously.”).
369 See id. at 543 (“The key reform is that courts would abandon the simplistic view that
the attorney general’s status as an elected representative of the state’s citizens automati-
cally translates into adequate representative of a subgroup of citizens in an adjudicative
context.”).
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of states participating in a multistate action.  Courts could consider what
leading AGs did in pursuing the investigation and negotiating the settlement.
But again, that puts the court in the difficult position of coming between
voters and their elected AG.  Courts would be hard pressed to declare an
elected AG inadequate.  Further, it is unlikely the court has the ability to
appoint another AG to lead multistate action.  Overall, courts are in a poor
position to evaluate the adequacy of representation by AGs on either layer of
“class action” in multistate actions.
Another avenue to increase judicial monitoring is for courts to more
closely scrutinize settlements negotiated by AGs.  Like their class action coun-
terparts, multistate actions against corporate defendants are almost always
settled.370  Some multistate settlements already require court approval.371
Courts could consider the presence of agency problems in evaluating multis-
tate settlements, such as whether leading states are stealing from participat-
ing states or whether borrowing is occurring.  Courts could also make
inquiries about the strength of the state law or the number of injured state
residents that may make AGs consider those factors at the outset of settle-
ment.  Increased judicial scrutiny could monitor AGs’ behavior during the
negotiation of a settlement and thus reduce agency costs in multistate
actions.
Increased judicial scrutiny of settlements is more palatable than courts
directly evaluating the adequacy of AG representation.  However, reforms
that require enhanced judicial scrutiny of multistate settlements are also
problematic.  In the class action context, it has been recognized that judicial
oversight “of the settlement’s adequacy has proved to be a weak reed on
which to rely.”372  And courts have been criticized for their approval of no
recovery and coupon settlements as “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”373
Courts may favor settlements for judicial economy, and requiring courts to
be more searching of settlements, especially when they cannot rely on the
adversarial process to challenge the settlement, may be a tall order.  Further-
more, not all multistate settlements require court approval.  If courts did pro-
vide additional scrutiny of multistate settlements, the parties could evade
such review by structuring their settlements like private parties as to not
require court approval.374  Courts reviewing multistate settlements would be
370 Id. at 498.
371 Cox, supra note 14, at 2378 (“Some enforcement actions face review by a court;
others do not.”).  Examples of multistate settlements that require court approval are con-
sent decrees and Assurances of Discontinuance (AODs) in states that require such court
approval.  Examples of multistate settlements that were consent decrees include the Master
Settlement Agreement with tobacco manufacturers, and an example of a settlement of
AOD includes the Target data breach multistate settlement. See supra notes 19, 87.
372 See Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note 125, at 237.
373 See Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 391 (2011); supra note
6 and accompanying text (providing an example of coupon settlements).
374 For example, multistate actions can settle pursuant to prelitigation settlement
agreements or seek voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(A)(ii). See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii); Cox, supra note 14, at 2355.  For exam-
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called upon to second guess the policy choices and trade-offs of elected
AGs.375
Nevertheless, judicial scrutiny could be an important part of an overall
series of reforms to reduce agency costs.  Judicial oversight has the benefit of
providing oversight of individual settlements, while other forms of monitor-
ing would likely consider settlements in the aggregate.  If AGs knew that they
faced enhanced judicial scrutiny at the time of settlement, it would change
their behavior in negotiating the settlement.  AGs would do greater factfind-
ing to satisfy the judge that the settlement was “fair, reasonable, and ade-
quate” on behalf of the state and its residents, while they currently aren’t
required to take those factors into consideration.376  Furthermore, enhanced
judicial scrutiny would also increase transparency about settlement alloca-
tions because presumably settlements would be the subject of public court
filings and hearings.  While increased judicial scrutiny may not by itself be
enough to monitor AGs in multistate settlements, judicial oversight could be
one of many reforms, including increased voter monitoring and legislative
oversight, to reduce class action squared problems.
CONCLUSION
With the increasing trend of multistate action and decline of the class
action comes the opportunity to assess the potential for agency costs in multi-
state actions.  Multistate actions are a form of class action squared because
they share similarities with class actions on two distinct levels.  Class action
squared brings with it an entirely new set of agency problems such as borrow-
ing and stealing, that could not occur if AGs brought action alone.  Increased
voter monitoring, legislative oversight, and judicial scrutiny are potential
reforms to address these unique class action squared problems.
ple, multistate settlements may occur as settlement agreements prior to litigation, such as
settlements of multistate actions with the RMBS Working Group. See, e.g., Dishman, supra
note 35, at 468–69.  The S&P multistate settlement prompted a voluntary dismissal of the
litigation that did not require court approval. See Joint Stipulation for Dismissal of Action
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), United States v. McGraw Hill
Co., No. 2:13-cv-00779 (filed in C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015).
375 See Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 7 at 438 (“Although many reforms R
are possible and could succeed, only one is sure to fail: reliance on trial court scrutiny of
the settlement.”); Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 9, at 543 (“[I]t puts courts in the
unenviable position of second-guessing the attorney general’s choices with respect to pol-
icy tradeoffs and other matters in which judges are unlikely to be expert.”).
376 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
